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1.1 Sport in a changing environment
The sports sector has traditionally been a self-regulating area, establishing its own 
rules both for the functioning of the games and of the sport bodies. However, it 
must be borne in mind that the society in which these sports activities take place 
is already regulated by national and international laws and, in the Member States 
of the European Community (E.C.), by Community law. Thus, there is a 
pluralism of laws as the sporting bodies have to abide both by the laws of society 
and by their own internal rules.1 Legal scrutiny of the sports sectors’ rules 
occurred very rarely until recently since the rules of the international sports 
federations stipulate, to a great extent, that disputes shall be subject to 
arbitration.2 Nevertheless, this independence from legal control is now being 
questioned in an environment where sports activities constitute an important 
sector of national and international economic activities. There is an interest in the 
legal assessment of sports, not least from a competition law view-point. This is 
due to the specific characteristics in the functioning of team sports which 
distinguishes them from other sectors of the economy and because of the actual 
restrictions in competition that exist, of which not all are necessary for the 
functioning of sports, but which merely constitute anti-competitive behaviour.
1.2 The aim and purpose of this paper
This LL.M. thesis deals with the development of sports into what may be defined 
as an “entertainment industry” and the legal complications related to this 
development. It thereby examines the applicability of competition law to sports, 
focusing on an assessment of the collective sales of broadcasting rights to sport 
events, specifically football matches. The limits for the applicability of 
competition law to sport bodies is analysed, taking into consideration that some 
horizontal restraints are necessary for the very existence of sports leagues. The 
competition law analysis is partly made as a case study of a judgment from the 
German Federal Supreme Court of December 1997, prohibiting the Deutscher 
FuBball-Bund, (DFB) - the German Football Association - from collectively 
selling the broadcasting rights for the home matches of German teams
Chapter 1 - Introduction
1 See e.g. Auneau, Gérard & Jacq, Patrick, Les particularismes des contentieux sportifs, JCP, Éd- G, No. 28, 
1996, p. 285.
2 Cf. Article 59(1) of FIFA’s (the International Football Federation) Statutes provide that: “National associations, 
clubs or club members shall not be permitted to refer disputes with the Federations or other associations, clubs or 
club members to a court of law and they shall agree to submit each one of such disputes to an arbitration tribunal 
appointed by common consent.” FIFA Article 59(3) provide that: “Even if the law of a country allows clubs or 
club members to a civil court any decision pronounced by sport bodies, clubs or club members shall refrain from 
doing so until all the possibilities of sports jurisdiction within, or under the responsibility of, their national 
association have been exhausted. The national associations shall ensure, as far as they can competently do so that 





























































































participating in the various European Cups.3 This invokes some questions 
regarding the economic specifics of professional teams sports, that is, whether it 
is legitimate to apply competition law to the sports sector, who in fact is the 
owner of the broadcasting rights to a sporting event, and to what extent the 
football clubs may cooperate within the league? In order to analyse these 
questions this thesis is divided into three main parts:
Part I presents an analysis of the economics of professional sports and the 
applicability of competition law;
Part II investigates the attribution of the broadcasting rights to sports events; and 
Part III uses two case studies in assessing competition law of the collective sale of
broadcasting rights to sport events.
Finally, there is a concluding Part IV which deals with the future application of
competition law to the sports sector.
1.3 The scope of this paper
This thesis deals with the applicability of competition law to the sports sector, the 
attribution of sports broadcasting rights, and the legality of the collective sale of 
broadcasting rights to football matches. A number of other interesting questions 
regarding sport broadcasting rights are connected to these issues; however, it is 
considered that those questions fall outside the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, 
these questions may be briefly mentioned. The first one to be raised is the 
purchase of exclusive sports rights for major sporting events, because, if they are 
too extensive in their scope, they may create barriers to entry into the sports rights 
market. The European Commission has established a policy to the effect that 
rights should not normally be granted for longer than one season since that risks 
foreclosing the market.4 Another question concerns access to sport rights through 
over-intensive cooperation between broadcasters. A joint venture between a 
number of broadcasters - part of the Eurovision system of the European 
Broadcasting Union and a private sports channel - was condemned by the 
Commission in the Eurosport decision as anti-competitive.5 A third issue is the 
establishment of an increasing number of pay television channels which has 
caused a debate on the question of public access to sports events on terrestrial 
television. In order to protect the viewers the revised version of the Television 
Without Frontiers Directive6 provides the possibility for the Member States of the
3 Decision of the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) of 11 December 1997, (KVR 7/96), WuW/E DE-R 17 
“Europapokalheimspiele” (hereafter “DFB”).
4 For a brief comment on this issue see section 5.2.2 infra.
5 See Commission decision of 19 February 1991, Screensport/EBU Members, O.J. 1991, L63/32; see also 
regarding the establishment of the channel in a modified version in the notification in Case No IV/34.605 - 
Eurosport Mark III, O.J. 1993 C76/8.
6 Directive 97/36/E.C. of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 amending Council 
Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action in member states concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities , O.J. L202/60 of 30.07.1997 





























































































European Community to protect certain events in the “public interest” so that they 
may be broadcast on free television.' This raises several questions on the limits of 
the right to information, as well as balancing the interest between the TV and the 
sports business and the rights of viewers to free broadcasting.
1.4 Method
Sport is a widely accepted concept referring to a great number of both team sports 
and individual sports which are played on an amateur or at a professional level. 
This paper analyses behaviour in the professional team sports sector, if not clearly 
stated otherwise. Team sports have been chosen because they show economic 
characteristics which distinguish them from individual sports, that is, 
interdependence between the parties and, to certain extents, a natural cartel 
situation. The discussion on the economic characteristics of sports relates to all 
team sports, whereas the analysis on the legitimacy of competition law 
application to the sports sector refers to all sports. The competition law analysis is 
limited to an assessment of football* 8 broadcasting rights. The reason for this 
choice is simply the economic importance of football and the fact that football is 
the sport that is most commonly subject to competition law examination although, 
this analysis may be applicable to other team sports to a certain extent. However, 
the Commission stated in relation to its upcoming decision regarding the
The TVWF Directive, ibid, provides for the possibility to list certain events that must be broadcasted on 
terrestrial television. The motives for the protection of the rights to access to major events is, according to point 
18 of the preamble, that “it is essential that Member States should be able to take measures to protect the right to 
information and to ensure wide access by the public to television coverage of national or non-national events of 
major importance for society, such as the Olympic Games, the Football World Cup and European Football 
Championship; whereas to this end Member States retain the right to take measures compatible with Community 
law aimed at regulating the exercise by broadcasters under their jurisdiction of exclusive broadcasting rights to 
such events." Article 3a(l) provides that each Member State must ensure, in accordance with Community law, 
that broadcasters under its jurisdiction do not broadcast on an exclusive basis events which are regarded by that 
Member State as being of major importance to society. These broadcasts must not be presented in such a way 
that they deprive a substantial proportion of the public in the Member State of the possibility of following such 
events either live or by deferred transmission on free television. Every Member State have a possibility to draw 
up a list of events, national or non-national, which it considers to be of major importance for society. The list 
shall be established in a clear and transparent manner in due and effective time. The Member State concerned 
shall also determine whether these events should be available via whole or partially live coverage, or where 
necessary or appropriate for objective reasons in the public interest, whole or partially deferred coverage. Article 
3a(2) provides that Member States which draw up a list have the obligation to immediately notify the 
Commission. The Commission shall, within a period of three months from the notification, verify that the 
measures are compatible with Community law. It shall also communicate them to the other Member States and 
seek the opinion of the Contact Committee. This list shall then be published in the Official Journal. The 
consolidated list of all the measures taken by Member States shall be published at least once a year. Under 
Article 3(a)(3) Member States has a duty by legislative measure to ensure that broadcasters under their 
jurisdiction, following the date of publication of this Directive, respect the lists established in other Member 
States in accordance with paragraph 1. This provisions permits the acquisition of exclusive rights for use in other 
Member States, but safeguards the interest of the state that has chosen to protect the event.
8 Note that football in the European context refers to soccer, whereas in the American context this term is 
equated with American football. However, for the sake of this competition law analysis, these forms of the game 
are considered to be equal. Hereinafter “football” and “American football” refers respectively to the two sports 




























































































broadcasting of the Formula One World Championships9 that this decision will 
not necessarily be applicable to other sports due to the specificity of the 
organisation of every sport.10
The analysis of rights to sport events is illustrated by existing regulations within 
the football sector; nevertheless, similar provisions may be found for other team 
sports. The judicial approach mainly focuses on the German courts, since this is 
the country to which the main part of this competition law analysis is oriented in 
Part III. However, reference is also made to some alternative solutions found in 
other Member States. What regards the assessment of the legality of competition 
law, this is made from a E.C. competition law perspective. All the same, the 
importance of the application of the various national competition legislations is 
outlined since it also plays an important role in a Community context and, indeed, 
the cases judged at a national level have an interest in the E.C. The case studies 
examined are two national cases, due to the fact that no such example has yet to 
be assessed at a Community level. That the cases chosen occurred in Germany 
and in the Netherlands should not be surprising especially considering that they 
are two of the major football nations in Europe where restrictions on competition 
amongst the football clubs may have important consequences for the sport 
broadcasting rights market. Moreover, a comparison is also made with the 
application of United States antitrust law towards sports rights agreements, 
mainly in order to give this analysis some interesting comparative aspects as die 
approaches on the different sides of the Atlantic Ocean are radically different.
9 Notification of agreements relating to the FIA (Fédération Internationale de l ’automobile) Formula One World 
Championship (Case No. IV/36.638 - FIA/FOA) O.J. 1997 C 361/05.
10 See Karel Van Miert's published speech, Sport et Concurrence: développements récents et action de la




























































































AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMICS 
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Chapter 2 - The basics - economic characteristics 
of professional team sports
2.1 The importance of economic analysis
In considering the development of professional sports, and especially that of 
football into a more and more commercialised business, it is argued in this section 
of the thesis that professional sports is a sector that has to abide by the rules of 
competition. Competition law can correct anti-competitive behaviour in the 
market and makes sure that football clubs do not overstep the mark when 
claiming that they have to cooperate in order to provide a product. The point of 
this analysis is to determine on which grounds competition law should be 
applicable to professional sports and also what are the limits to its applicability. 
Although law and economics are two separate disciplines, they are very much 
interrelated, especially in the area of competition analysis. In this chapter, the 
economic characteristics of professional team sports are outlined, thus providing 
the basis for this competition law analysis. The applicability of Community law 
in general to sports bodies is summarised in the next chapter; it is followed by an 
assessment of the legitimacy of E.C. competition law, as well as an analysis as to 
whether national competition laws may be applicable in a general sense to sport 
bodies.
2.1.1 The uncertainty o f outcome hypothesis
Football in Europe is mainly played within the context of national leagues and the 
clubs are associated to national football federations. It has long been questioned 
by economists whether sport can be comparable to other businesses due to the 
interdependence displayed between the parties, that is, the clubs playing against 
each other in a league.11 W.C. Neale, as well as P. Sloane, claims that the 
economics of team sports are peculiar, since it is not possible to provide the 
product - entertainment - unless at least two teams, which are rival producers, 
cooperate.12 This horizontal cooperation is seldom permitted in other businesses 
but is regarded as anti-competitive.13 In a competitive industry, the inefficient 
producer is driven out of business so that only efficient and viable firms remain in 
operation. But, in professional team sports, the situation is completely to the
11 Neale, W.C.; The peculiar economics o f professional sports. Quartelv Journal of Economics, LXVV1I, No. 1 
February 1964, quoted by Sloane, Peter, Editorial: The economics o f sport, an overview, Economic affairs, Vol. 
17, September 1997, p. 2.
12 See Sloane, P., Sport in the Market? The Economic Causes and Consequences o f the Packer revolution', 
Hobart Paper 85, The Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1980, p. 15.
13 Cf. prohibition in Article 85(1) of the E.C. Treaty (hereafter Article 85): “The following shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the common market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their 
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market and in 
particular those which: (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling pnees or any other trading conditions, (b) 
limit or control production, markets, technical development or investment; (c) share markets or sources of 
supply”. But cf. cooperation for research & development that is generally treated favourably, see for example 




























































































contrary as the clubs need to combine to survive. The individual clubs have a 
vested interest not only in the continued existence of other clubs, but also in their 
economic viability as competitors in order to maximise the interest of spectators 
and hence revenues through the sale of the product - the individual match.14 This 
so-called uncertainty of outcome hypothesis suggests that sporting competition 
must not be too unequal, because if one or two clubs become too strong then 
eventually spectator interest will wane.15 It is thus the nature of the product which 
creates the requirement of uncertainty regarding outcome.16 P. Sloane considers 
that the uncertainty of outcome in the result of games is the key to the economic 
analysis of professional team sports.17 He argues that it is on this hypothesis that 
the justification for sporting leagues rests, thus restricting competition in the price 
and the output of individual member clubs, as well as in their property right to 
players contracts.
2.1.2 The necessity o f sports cartels
Cartelisation in the form of leagues is necessary in the sports sector in order to 
create a viable product in the first place.18 It has been argued that the major issues 
for ‘the sporting cartel’ - that is the league - are the number of producers or the 
size of the league, the location of production, the allocation of playing resources, 
admission prices and revenue-sharing arrangements.19 In addition, league 
organisations may also negotiate contracts for member clubs with TV companies, 
and industrial sponsors. The theory which deals with uncertainty of outcome and 
the necessity of the league to restrict competition between the clubs has created a 
debate among economists, disputing whether the league, rather than the club, is 
the equivalent of the ‘undertaking’ in a normal competitive industry or whether 
the league should rather be considered as a cartel which cross-subsidises its 
members.20 This leads to the question of whether sport should be exempted from 
the scope of competition law since these markets are normally unstable and it is 
not feasible for all teams to be successful all the time, resulting in the revenues of 
unsuccessful teams being lower.21
Despite the economic characteristics of professional team sports it is argued in 
this LL.M. thesis that competition law should be applicable to the sports sector. 
However, as the judicial approach towards the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis 
makes clear, the question is not whether to permit or to prohibit restrictions on the
14 See Sloane. P., Sport in the Market? The Economic Causes and Consequences o f  the 'Packer revolution 
supra note 12, p. 16.
15 See Sloane, P., The economics o f  sport, an overview, supra note 11, p. 2.
16 See Sloane, P., Sport in the Market? The Economic Causes and Consequences o f the 'Packer revolution', 
supra note 12, p. 16.
17 Ibid. p. 25.
18 Ibid. p. 40.
19 Ibid. p. 40
20 Ibid. p. 16




























































































league in order to preserve competition between the teams, but how to do this in 
the less restrictive way. In any case tire applicability of competition law does not 
mean that there is a per se prohibition on any cooperation between the league 
members. In this respect, the functioning of the league must play an important 




























































































Chapter 3 - With what legitimacy is competition law applied 
to the sports sector in Europe?
3.1 Introductory remarks
As was outlined in the previous chapter, the economic characteristics of sports 
suggest that they may have a special status in the legal context. It must be taken 
into account that the sports sector has long been self-regulating; indeed within 
each sport, there are between one and several levels to the hierarchical bodies 
which create the rules for their own individual needs and which then survey the 
application of them. These rules were previously rare subjects for any judicial 
proceedings, but, in subsequent instances of dispute, they have become a subject 
for arbitration.'2 Therefore, this chapter examines the role of law as a control 
instrument to behaviour in the sports sector. Despite current self-regulation in 
certain aspects, the era of total ‘immunity’ from legal scrutiny seems to have 
ended. The turning-point in Europe is mainly attributed to the applicability of 
European Community law to the sports sector. The competence of the 
Community in relation to sports cannot be directly provided by the Treaty of 
Rome of 1957 establishing the European Economic Community (E.E.C.)* 23 No 
specific provisions were established in this regard when the E.E.C. Treaty was 
signed and nor have any amendments been made subsequently. However, a 
protocol was added to the Treaty of Amsterdam signed in 1997 which recognises 
the importance of sport in society.24 Nonetheless, this is only a declaration 
without legal value; therefore its importance in regard to the applicability of the 
Amsterdam Treaty to sports can be questioned. Community competence does not 
emanate explicitly from the E.E.C. Treaty nor the E.C. Treaty, which is the 
E E C. Treaty as amended by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Therefore, an 
examination as to how the European Court of Justice - the highest interpreter of 
Community law - through its case law has developed a competence for the 
Community institutions to assess certain matters in relation to sports is presented. 
National courts have a competency in assessing matters which impose rights and 
obligations on individuals, so long as they do not conflict with Community 
provisions, that is, when the Community provisions have direct effect.25 In 
addition, national courts may have possibilities to assess behaviour in the sports 
sector on matters that fall outside the scope of Community law but which lie 
within the scope of their national jurisdictions. The degree to which the
“  See section 1 1 supra.
23 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty), Rome 1957
24 The declaration on sports in the Protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty reads as follows. “The Conference 
emphasises the social significance of sport, in particular its role in forging identity and bringing people together. 
The Conference therefore calls on the bodies of the European Union to listen to sports associations when 
important questions affecting sports are at issue. In this connection, special consideration should be given to the 
particular characteristics of amateur sport." Despite the declaration’s lack of legal value it indicates that the 
Member States have recognised the place sport plays in society and its European dimension.
25 For direct effect of Articles 85(1) and (2) and 86 see C-127/73 BRT v SABAM [ 1974] ECR 51, at 16, 17 and C- 




























































































legitimacy of Community rules is applicable to sports, and in what circumstances 
the Community and national competition rules might be applied, is developed in 
the remainder of this chapter.
3.2 Sport is subject to the E.C.Treaty when considered 
as an economic activity
It took almost twenty years of applying the E.E.C. Treaty before the question of 
its applicability to sports was brought up before the European Court of Justice in 
1974, through the Walrave case.26 The origin of this case was a request for a 
preliminary ruling from a national court under Article 177 E.E.C. for an 
interpretation of the Treaty. The national proceeding related to two Dutch 
nationals - Walrave and Kock - who were prevented from acting as pacemakers 
in, inter alia, the bicycle World Championships due to the rules of the Union 
Cycliste Internationale (the international association for cycling) according to 
which the pacemaker and the cyclist had to be of the same nationality The 
European Court of Justice was thereby obliged to assess the applicability of 
Community law to sports in the context of Articles 7, 48 and 59 of the E.E.C. 
Treaty. It held that “[hjaving regard to the objectives of the Community, the 
practise of sports is subject to Community law only in so far as it constitutes an 
economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty.”27 Furthermore, 
the Court held that Community law could be applied to the rules of private 
sporting associations.28
The Court of Justice confirmed its position regarding Walrave in 1976, when 
another preliminary reference, Donò v Maniero,29 was made. The Court had to 
give its interpretation of Article 48 E.E.C. in relation to the free movement of 
football players because the rules of Federazione Italiana Gioco Calcio (FIGC) - 
the Italian Football Association - prevented the use of foreign players in Italian 
league football. Almost twenty years passed before the European Court of Justice 
was next confronted with interpreting the E.C. Treaty and the rules of sports 
bodies when in 1995 it gave its preliminary ruling in the Bosnian case.30
This case is one of the most renowned in the Court’s history and the one that 
finally made the sports industry realise that the Community actually has an 
integral say in their doings. Furthermore, the case indicates that the Court intends 
to use this competence when it discovers breaches in the application and usage of 
the basic principles of the Community and of the Common Market. The legal 
issues in the Bosnian case concerned a question as to whether the rules governing
26 Case C-36/74, Walrave and Kock v Union Cycliste Internationale, ECR [1974] 1405
27 Ibid, at 4.
28 Ibid, at 17-18
25 Case C-13/76, Donà v Mantero, ECR [1976] 1333, at 17-18.
30 Case C-415/93, Union Royal Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and others v Bosnian and others 




























































































the Union of European Football Associations (Union des Associations 
Européennes de Football) - UEFA - transfer system of football players was 
compatible with Article 48 E.C. on the free movement of workers and with the 
competition rules provided for in Articles 85 and 86 E.C. Moreover, the Court 
also had to assess the compatibility of a limitation on the number of foreign 
players in a football team with the same Community rules. The Court began its 
ruling by confirming the applicability of Community law to sport when it is an 
economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty, as established in 
the case law of Walrave and Donà31 It thereby rejected submissions from one 
party which tried to deny the admissibility of the case by claiming that the 
economic activity of smaller football clubs is negligible, neither was the Court 
persuaded by the argument that football is “in most cases” not an economic 
activity.3" After having found the case admissible, the Court assessed the rules 
under question through Article 48. It found that both the transfer rules and the 
limitation on foreign players were incompatible with Article 48. Because of this 
finding, it contented itself by answering the national court in its preliminary 
reference with its contention that the rules which the national court’s question 
referred to were contrary to Article 48 regarding the free movement of persons 
and held that it was not necessary to rule on the interpretation of Articles 85 and 
86 of the Treaty.31 23 The outcome of this preliminary ruling in the Bosman case is 
that there now exists a prohibition on the payment of a sum of money for 
international transfers of professional players or amateurs turning professional, on 
the expiry of their contract, within the European Union (E.U.) and the European 
Economic Area (EEA). Moreover, it removed the limits which had been placed 
on the number of players from other Member States eligible to take part in club 
competitions.
3.3 Applicability of the competition rules?
A fundamental question arises: as soon as it is established that the Treaty is 
applicable to sport bodies, is it established that the Treaty’s provisions on 
competition also becomes applicable? The case law of the European Court of 
Justice, is not much in evidence on this question. Unfortunately, the Court’s 
preliminary judgment in the Bosman case does not give any indication at all on 
how to assess the compatibility of the rules of football’s transfer system with the 
E.C.’s competition rules. The Court contented itself to state that it was not 
necessary to rule on the interpretation of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty.34 
Otherwise, this case would have been the first where the European Court of 
Justice confronted an assessment of the applicability of sports rules with the 
E.C.’s rules on competition. At the time of writing, no other cases have been
31 Case C-36/74, Walrave, supra note 26 and Case C-13/76, Dona, supra note 29.
32 Case C-415/93 Bosman, supra note 30, at 70 and 72.
33 Ibid at 138.




























































































brought in front of the Court of Justice in this respect. However, Advocate 
General Lenz developed a view which, in his opinion on the Bosnian case, held 
that the rules on competition were applicable when assessing the transfer 
system.35 Other decisions have additionally been dealt with by the Commission 
and the Court of First Instance.36 In order to establish the grounds upon which 
they based this applicability, the aim and the purpose of the competition law 
system, as well as its criteria for applicability, must be outlined.
3.3.1 The aim and purpose o f competition policy
Competition law is the weapon utilised to deal with market behaviour which 
distorts competition in the Common Market Certain market behaviour is 
considered as undesirable as it restricts competition and thereby affects consumer 
welfare.37 The protection of consumer welfare it thus a central aim of competition 
policy. Another goal of competition policy is to provide for the freedom of action 
of smaller competitors in the market while promoting market integration in the 
Common Market.38 E.C. competition policy does not make any distinctions 
between different business activities, but is in fact applicable to all sectors of the 
economy.39 However, certain sectors have been given specific treatment due to 
special market circumstances. Richard Whish and Brenda Sufrin have commented 
that “social or political value lead to the conclusion that competition is 
inappropriate in particular economic sectors.”40 One example which is cited is 
agriculture with reference made to the Common Agricultural Policy of the 
Community. Thus, a question arises: what motivates such special treatment and, 
indeed, can it be argued that sport, due to its specific economic characteristics, 
should not be subject either to the Community rules on competition or to national 
competition rules? This issue is analysed by first establishing what criteria are 
necessary for the applicability of Community competition rules and, secondly, by 
assessing whether the activities of sport bodies fulfils these criteria.
3.3.2 Criteria for applicability o f E.C. competition law
The first criterion concerning the applicability of Article 85 is to establish the 
existence of an agreement or concerted practice between undertakings or 
association o f undertakings. The other criterion is the existence of a restriction on 
competition which distorts inter-state trade and that such restriction is
35 See Opinion of Advocate General Lenz on Union Royal Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and others 
v Bosnian and others ( ‘Bosnian '), [1995] ECR 4932.
36 See Package tour decision of 27 October 1992, O.J. 1992 L 326/31, and Case T-46/92 Scottish Football 
Association v Commission [1994] ECR 11-1039.
37 See e.g. Korah, EC Competition Law and Practice, 6th ed. 1997, p. 9.
38 Ibid. pp. 10-11.
39 Ibid. pp. 10-11.




























































































appreciable.41 The criteria in Article 85(1) do not give much indication as to 
whether any specific treatment should be given in the application of such criteria 
to sport bodies. Since there is little case law in this area, and few comments in 
literature, it is hard to consider whether Article 85(1) shall be applied to sports in 
just the same way as it applies to any other industry.42
3.3.3 Compel it ion law may be applicable to sports bodies as soon 
as they undertake an economic activity
The first thing to establish regarding the applicability of Article 85(1) is whether 
sport clubs or national federations constitute undertakings within the meaning of 
Article 85(1). The notion of undertaking under the E.C. Treaty encompasses, 
according to established case law “every entity engaged in economic activity, 
regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed.”43 
Since professional football clubs engage in economic activity they fall within the 
notion of undertaking. Indeed, football associations, which are non-profit making 
associations, are included within this scope since the concept of undertaking does 
not suppose a profit-making intention.44 45The Commission held for the first time in 
the Package Tour Decision - which regarded the sale of tickets to football 
matches of the 1990 World Cup in Italy - that football clubs constitute 
undertakings within the meaning of Article 85(1 ).43 Moreover, the Commission 
considered that associations of undertakings may be regarded as ‘undertakings’ as 
far as they engage in an economic activity. It thereby held that the Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) - the International Football 
Federation - and FIGC, inter alia, carried out activities of an economic nature and 
therefore should be regarded as undertakings.46 Advocate General Lenz held in 
his opinion on the Bosnian case that the individual football associations should be 
regarded as associations of undertakings within the meaning of Article 85, despite 
the fact that not only professional, but also amateur, clubs belongs to these 
associations.47
In relation to the applicability of Article 85(1), it must also be established that the 
agreement in question prevents, restricts or distorts competition to a not
41 Cf. "Commission de minimis notice” Notice of agreements of minor importance which do not fall within the 
meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, O.J. C 372/04, 9.12.97, the Notice 
does, however, not bind the Community Courts.
42 Dirk Brinckman, & Vollebregt, Erik, The Marketing o f Sports and its Relation to E.C. Competition Law, 
[1998] E.C.L.R., 284, indicate that a not yet published draft paper of the Commission (Broadcasting of Sports 
Events and Competition Law) outlines the considerations DGIV are likely to consider when assessing 
agreements concerning TV broadcasting rights to sport events.
43 See Case C-4\ 190 fiofner and Elser v Macotron [1991] ECR 1-1979 at 21.
44 See joined cases 209-215 and 218/78 Van Landewyck v Commission [1980] ECR 3125 at 88.
45 The Commission established for the first time in the “Package tour decision, supra note 36 “that competition 
law is applicable also to sports federations”.
46 Ibid, at 49 and 53, see also Case T-46/92 Scottish Football Association v Commission supra note 36.




























































































insignificant extent48 49and that it affects trade between Member States; these 
criteria are not established further here. However, it shall be noted that, when 
there is an anti-competitive agreement or practice but the criteria of interstate 
trade and appreciable effect are not fulfilled, the Member States’ national 
competition laws might be applicable. Several of these national competition acts 
act as mirrors to the provisions in Articles 85 and 86, save for the requirement of 
trade between Member States.
3.3.4 Legal assumption - restrictions must be necessary and indispensable 
Having established that arrangements where sports bodies are involved formally 
implies that the rules on competition might be applicable, since these bodies 
constitute undertakings, it must be discussed whether the relationships between 
these bodies shall influence the legal analysis.
The specific economic characteristics of professional sports, especially regarding 
the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, does not only play a role in the economic 
analysis. The economic characteristics of team sports have also been considered 
in the legal assessment of the professional sports sector. However, it appears that 
there is a limit as to how far different actions may be justified by the uncertainty 
of outcome. Advocate General Lenz emphasised in the Bosnian case that the 
Court makes an evaluation under Article 85(1) and added that this “shows that 
only restrictions of competition which are indispensable for attaining the 
legitimate objectives pursued by them do not fall within Article 85(1).5,49 The 
Advocate General held that the Court regards restriction on competition as 
compatible with Article 85(1) if, taking all the circumstances of the particular 
case into account, it is apparent that without those restrictions the competition to 
be protected would not be possible at all.50 Only restrictions of competitions that 
are “indispensable for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by them” do not 
fall within Article 85(1).51 Advocate General Lenz proceeded to recognise that 
professional football is different from other markets due to the mutual 
dependence which exists between the clubs, wherefore certain restrictions may be 
necessary for the “proper functioning of the sector.”52 Lenz held, in relation to the 
transfer rules at stake in the Bosnian case, that, if they were not necessary and 
indispensable for the purpose of ensuring the proper functioning of the sector the 
positive effects may only be examined under Article 85(3) E.C., an assessment 
which has to be made by the Commission because it has got the exclusive
48 Cf. de minimis notice, supra note 41 which states that for appreciability of the market share, a relevant market 
has to be established; cf. Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purpose of Community 
competition law, OJ C372/03, 9.12.97.
49 See Opinion of AG Lenz on Bosnian, supra note 35, at 269.
50 Ibid, where A.G. Lenz in note 340 referred in particular to Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière v 
Machinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235, at 250 and in note 341 to Case 250/92 Gottrup-Klim v Dansk Landbrugs 
Growarelseskab [1994] ECR 1-5641.
51 See Opinion of AG Lenz on Bosnian, supra note 35 at 269.




























































































competence for granting an individual exemption from Article 85(1) by 
application of Article 85(3). It is presumed in this thesis that, even though the 
Bosnian case did not concern the sale of television rights, the same principles 
shall account for the sale of broadcasting rights by football clubs; this thesis also 
holds that eventually restrictive measures must be necessary and indispensable for 
the functioning of the organisation of football in order to be found non-restrictive 
under Article 85(1) or exempted under Article 85(3).
3.3.5 Distinction between consequences o f a decision and applicability o f a rule 
It is important to distinguish the establishment of applicability of a rule and the 
consequences of a decision due to this applicability. As exemplified by Advocate 
General Lenz, it does not matter for the free movement of persons whether a 
match lasts for 90 or only for 80 minutes or whether two points or three are 
awarded for winning a game. However, Lenz found, as did the Court, that the 
rules on transfers are different because they restrict free movement and thus are 
lawful only if justified by imperative reasons in the public interest.53 Lenz further 
held that the eventual consequences of the judgment to the functioning of sports 
does not make the Community rules inapplicable, but do, however, have to be 
taken into account when answering the question.54 As one author has commented 
on the Bosnian case, “[o]ne would not have supposed the Court would have been 
prepared to place a particular industry uniquely beyond the jurisdiction of 
Community law. Although the Court was not unaware that its judgment could 
exert a profound impact on the football industry, it commented that ‘this cannot 
go so far as to diminish the objective character of the law’ (para 77). Its sole 
concession was a willingness to exercise its self-endowed power to limit the 
temporal effects of the judgment.”55
This example of the applicability of the provisions on free movement to certain 
sports regulations may be seen as parallel to the rules on competition; competition 
law will not interfere with the rules of the game, and vice versa, unless there is 
serious reason for it to do so. The applicability of competition law to the sports 
sector does not mean any per se prohibitions. Competition law shall be applicable 
to, and regulate, the provisions that restrict or diminish competition, and, if they 
do not have justifying benefits for consumers, less restrictive solutions must be 
found. If certain rules regulating the functioning of sports comes under 
competition law, scrutiny of their purpose must be taken into account under such 
an assessment. Most important is consideration of the special economics of 
professional team sports, so that the uncertainty of outcome balance is not 
destroyed and the very existence of the league threatened.56
53 Ibid, at 215.
54 Ibid, at 128.
ss See Weatherill, Stephen, Comment on Bosnian , CML Rev. 33, [1996] p. 1001.
56 F. Romani, F., & F. Mosetti, II diritto nel pal lone: spunti per un'analisi economica della sentenza Bosman, 




























































































3.3.6 Applicability o f national competition laws
Why present the previous discussion about the justifications of applying 
Community law and E.C. competition law to sport bodies when the case studies 
that are utilised in Part III of this thesis do not concern Community competition 
law because the cases have been assessed by national competition law authorities 
applying national competition law? The reasons for this are three-fold. First, it 
sets the limits for when Community law is applicable to the sports sector and, 
more specifically, distinguishes when Community competition law is applicable 
and what criteria must therefore be taken into consideration. Secondly, this 
emphasis on Community law stresses the international role of sports. Thirdly, the 
applicability of Community law to sport sets up a framework for the importance 
of the legal scrutiny of sports regulations to be examined in a national context.
The enforcement of Community law takes place at different levels and, despite 
the supremacy of E.C. law, the national courts still play a substantial role in 
implementing and formulating competition policy.57 58The national competition 
authorities may either apply Articles 85(1) and 86, when the conditions therein 
are fulfilled, or they may apply their national competition laws. The national 
competitions laws can be applied when the criterion on interstate trade is not 
fulfilled or, when the criterion of appreciable effect is not fulfilled, if the national 
acts have lower thresholds. A paradox exists, however, in that interstate trade is a 
widely defined concept,38 wherefore many agreements fall within this concept 
although confined within one Member State. The trade of television broadcasting 
rights for football matches, for example, especially in an international context 
such as the various European Cups, may very well be interpreted to have a 
Community interest. Nevertheless, the Bundeskartellamt, the German Federal 
Cartel Office, decided to assess this case under German national competition law 
without ever mentioning a possible infringement of Article 85(1).59 The same
football industry: “A nostro avviso, la sentenza Bosnian farà molto meno danno di quanto non si tema, e la reale 
portata dei suoi effetti, probibalmente, non giustifica tutto il clamore che interno ad essa si è generato. In 
relazione all’abolizione degli indennizi, infatti, ci sembra che la pronuncia della Corte di Giustitzia non avrà, 
tutto sommato, effetti particolarmente rilevanti, e certamente non comporteà modifiche nella cirolazione dei 
calciatori. Per quanto concerne, invece, l’eliminazione del limite all’utilizziodei calciatori stranieri, la sentenza 
avrà, al massimo, il benfico effetto di liberalizzare un mercato protetto e di aumentare la concorrenza.”
57 See Goyder, D.G., E.C. Competition law, 1993, pp. 426, 430-37.
58 See Case C-8/72 Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v Commission [1972] ECR 391, at 28-30 where the 
Court assessed the agreement of a trade organisation of which most Dutch cement dealers were members, that 
recommended the sales prices in the Netherlands. The outcome was that Article 85(1) was held to be applicable 
although the agreement was restricted to activities in a single Member State.
59 It was only the Berlin Court of Appeals that touched on the possibility that the provisions subject of the 
proceeding actually have crossborder effects and therefore might infringe upon Article 85(1). The possibilities of 
crossborder effects of the agreement were briefly commented upon in relation to it rejecting the possibilities of \  
exempting the agreement. It held that “it may be left open whether an exemption is ruled out if only for the 
reason that the central marketing of rights does not only violate Section 1 of the ARC but owing to cross-border 
effects possibly Art. 85(1) of the E.C. Treaty as well, and whether in the event of an exemption under Section 
5(2) and (3) of the ARC a conflict with the exemption under Art. 85(3) of the E.C. Treaty might occur. An 




























































































reasoning accounts for the sale of the television broadcasting rights for matches 
of the Dutch national football league by the Dutch Football Federation - 
Koninldijke Nederlandsche Voetbal Bond (KNVB) - which were assessed by the 
Minesterie van Economiche Zaken - the Dutch Competition Authority - under the 
Dutch Competition Act. It is common that national leagues of top football nations 
acquire a great spectator interest from other Member States; thus a legitimate 
Community interest might be found here as well. However, it is generally 
recognised that the national competition authorities are reluctant to apply the 
Community’s competition rules, even if the criteria are fulfilled, but, that they 
prefer to apply their respective national competition laws. This is, for instance 
argued by V. Korah, who is of the opinion that the national competition law 
authorities are more likely to invoke national law than the community provisions 
when assessing a competition law case.60 Germany has a long tradition of 
applying competition law, wherefore the Bundeskartellamt, applies national 
competition law to a large extent, although it used to apply both systems in a dual 
application if all the criteria was fulfilled.61 In the Netherlands, the application of 
Community competition law has remained highly theoretical, even if the 
competition authorities have indicated that they consider themselves competent to 
apply those rules. However, the power excersisable under the Dutch competition 
Act, Wet economiche mededinging, has not been used.62
3.3.7 Conclusion: competition policy is, within certain limits, the right
instrument to deal with anti-competitive behaviour in the sports sector 
The establishment of the applicability of the Treaty to sport was due to several 
preliminary rulings in the European Court of Justice, especially on rules of 
national and international sport federations which prohibited the free movement 
of persons, one of the fundamental principles of the European Community. The 
Court advised the national court that rules of sports organisations fall within the 
scope of the Treaty when sport constitutes an economic activity. It is undeniable 
that many activities of sports organisations, especially professional ones, concern 
economic activities. It is argued that there is no need for Community law to 
interfere with the social and cultural aspects of sport, however, as the competition 
rules shall be applied to the economic aspects of the sports sector. Nevertheless, 
the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity must be taken into consideration
station may be considered as buyer of TV rights to an away match of an Italian club in Germany. This need not 
be examined more closely, though, for the central granting of rights is not exemptable under Section 5(2) and (3) 
of the ARC anyway.” As was the case with competition law authorities in many other Member States, the 
Bundeskartellamt chose to assess the case under national competition acts, (see Decision of the Cartel Division 
of the Berlin Court of Appeals of 8 November 1995, DFB (Kart 21/94), WuW/E OLG 5565,at II.B. 3).
60 See Korah, EC Competition Law and Practice, supra note 37, p. 24.
61 See e g. Schmittmann, M. & G.J. Thwaite, The dualism o f German and EC Competition Law: Some 
Prognostic Observations in Frontiers of Competition Law, Ed. Dr. Julian Lombay, Institute of European law, 
University of Birmingham, 1994.





























































































in this context. Competition law has an essential role to fulfil in order to ensure 
that there is competition in the sports sector; it is argued that this is especially 
important when conduct in the sports sector influences activities in other markets. 
An example of this phenomenon arises in respect to sports bodies’ sale of rights 
for television transmissions. The sale of these rights to broadcasters, which are 
dependent on obtaining the sports television transmission broadcasting rights, 
highly influences the conditions in which the sports broadcasting market operates. 
However, when competition law is applied, it must be ensured that the economic 
characteristics of professional team sports are taken into consideration, so that the 
sports sector may continue to flourish and competition between the teams may be 
upheld, both on a market, as well as on a sports, level .63
In accordance with Advocate General Lenz’s opinion in Bosnian, it is arguable 
that, if it is the less restrictive means which are used, the restriction may be found 
not to be anti-competitive. Moreover, an individual exemption from Article 85(1) 
may be granted by the Commission in accordance with the criteria in Article 
85(3). The criteria for such exemption is that the agreement contributes to the 
production or to the distribution of the product (televised professional football 
matches), or to promoting technical or economic progress while allowing the 
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits. Furthermore, the restrictions must 
be indispensable for the attainment of theses objectives and not eliminate 
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products. Not only the 
Community institutions, but also the national courts and competition authorities, 
play an important role in the enforcement of competition policy within the 
European Community, that is, competition both in interstate trade and inside the 
Member States.
63 Note that also state aid to sport organisations may interfere with the competitive balance between teams of 


























































































































































































Chapter 4 - The economic importance of sports broadcasting rights
4.1 The increasing prices
The rights to the broadcasting of sports events and the assignment of such rights 
today plays an essential role in the economy of professional sports. Sports 
broadcasting is also of essential value both for commercial television channels, in 
order to attract advertisers, and to pay television channels, in order to attract 
subscribing viewers. The broadcasting sector, as well as the sports sector, has 
been subject to a dramatic transformation during the last ten years. The sports 
sector has become increasingly involved in commercial activities. The 
broadcasting sector has, having occupied one of the most regulated sectors in 
Europe, where the existence of state broadcasting monopolies was the rule, 
underwent drastic change due to deregulation and to the rapid emergence of new 
technologies. Diversity in the broadcasting sector was previously, for the most 
part limited due to the ‘spectrum constraint’, that is the scarcity of frequencies on 
the radio spectrum for delivering the signal.64 65At the present time, however, there 
are several alternatives to traditional terrestrial television including cable, satellite 
and digital television. There are even specialised sports channels. Consequently, a 
wide range of sport events are broadcasted today on numerous public and private 
channels. Hence, exclusive sports rights are sold for considerable sums because 
they attract audiences as well as advertisers. How the prices of these rights have 
increased lately is best illustrated by looking at some examples.
The rights for the highlights of the two professional football leagues in the 
Netherlands (Eredivisie and Eerste Divisie) were granted for approximately six 
million guilder in 1989, eighteen million guilder for the 1993-1994 season, and 
for the 1997-1998 season for 38.8 million guilder, that is; indeed the purchasing 
costs increased eight times during this period.63 The rights to the English Premier 
League for the 1992-1996 season were sold for 62 million pounds sterling. The 
rights for the following five seasons - 1997-2001 - garnered a fee of 743 million 
pounds - more than ten times as much.66 Competition for the rights to attractive 
events have certainly grown due to increased competition between the 
broadcasters. Nevertheless, it is questionable as to whether these high prices 
really are the effect of a sound market supply/demand reaction or whether they 
are influenced by the monopolistic cartel position that certain sports federations 
have ensured for themselves by setting prices and restricting competitive freedom 
for the sports clubs. This issue, which is developed in Part III of this thesis, is 
intimately linked to the question as to who actually owns the rights to a sporting 
event, an issue which is analysed below.
64 See Motta, M., & M. Polo, Concentration and public policies in the broadcasting industry: the future o f  
television, Economic policy, Vol. 1, 1997, Blackwell, Oxford, p. 295.
65 See decision by Ministerie van Economische Zaken of 22 December 1997, KNVB, ES/MW 97080628.b3S, at 
77.




























































































4.2 Disputes over the rights
The attribution of rights is a complicated issue and different sets of rules seem to 
clash with each other which invokes legal problems as to who the rights belongs. 
Consequently, several legal disputes have occurred recently where football clubs 
and national federations have been fighting over the rights. In order to present 
some background information for this discussion, as to who should be the rightful 
owner of an event, it firstly needs to be explained as to which entities may be 
involved in the organisation of a football tournament. Thereafter, dieir actions on 
the sports rights market are outlined. Then, different theories on the ownership of 
a sports event is discussed, both on a theoretical level and as illustrated through 
case law, in an attempt to present a solution to the question as to whom shall the 
ownership of a football match be attributed.67 Finally, some concluding remarks 
try' to present a solution to the question of the attribution of rights, that is the most 
suitable answer in various contexts. 6
6 However, this is not an attempt to analyse the philosophical aspects of ownership, as this discussion is limited 




























































































Chapter 5 - Setting the scene - the football broadcasting industry
5.1 The hierarchical organisation of professional football
In order to understand the relations between the different actors organising a 
football match or a football tournament, it is necessary to describe the hierarchical 
organisation of a professional team sport such as football.6* The same 
organisational structure may, nonetheless, also be applicable to almost any 
professional team sport.
5.1.1 Local level
Football at the local level is an organised team sport played in clubs. Although 
not every professional football club is an undertaking in a strict legal sense, those 
clubs abiding in some Member States by the rules governing associations, 
football clubs may generally be described as undertakings, because they organise 
the matches, sell tickets et cetera. Professional football clubs employ the players 
who are thus subject to employment contracts and who are then remunerated 
according to the terms of those contracts.
5.1.2 National level
Professional football clubs, as well as certain amateur clubs, are joined together in 
national associations. There is one football association in each Member State 
which organises the sport at a national level, except for, the United Kingdom, 
where for historical reasons England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland each 
have their own individual football association. The responsibility of the national 
associations are, inter alia, to implement the international federation's rules, to set 
up rules for the national league, to organise national leagues and to set up a 
national team. In some countries, as for example in Germany, regional 
associations, based on lander, have a coordinating role between the clubs and the 
national association.
5.1.3 International level
The national football associations are joined together world-wide in FIFA, whose 
seat is in Zurich, Switzerland. The national associations have an obligation to 
implement the rules of FIFA within their respective countries. Every fourth year 
FIFA organises the World Cup on the territory of one host nation (in 2002, they 
will do so with two host nations) as well as the qualification tournaments. Within 
FIFA, there are several smaller groupings which are comprised of the associations 
of a particular geographical continent. 68
68 For the organisational structure of football see e g. Opinion of A.G. Lenz on Bosnian, supra note 35 at 4-5. See 
also Townley, Stephen & Edward Grayson, Sponsorship o f Sports, Art and Leisure: Law , Tax and Business 




























































































5.1.4 Continental confederations - UEFA
The national football associations in Europe adhere to the continental 
confederation UEFA.69 In addition to the 18 associations of the E.C., there are a 
large number of other football associations in Europe, so that UEFA currently has 
around 50 members in all. UEFA also has its seat in Switzerland. UEFA has, 
inter alia, the function of organising every four years the European 
Championship - the finals and the qualifying competitions - for its constituent 
national teams. Moreover, UEFA has been handling three different tournaments 
for club teams - the European Champions’ Cup, the European Cup Winners’ Cup 
and the UEFA Cup (previously the Fairs Cup) - for over 30 years.70
5.1.5 Additional bodies
In addition to the aforementioned sports bodies, there are also leagues and 
organising committees which can be set up for the specific organisation of an 
individual or ongoing tournament. Leagues are the form of organised competition 
in which clubs generally participate; sanction from the national federation is 
usually required as to where they are to operate at a national level.71 The leagues 
are sometimes more important as organising bodies than the national federations. 
Organising committees can arise at various stages throughout the hierarchy, since 
they are set up to organise a specific event or series of events. It is customary in 
most sports for the organising committee of an international event to be the 
national federation of the host country.72 In the case of football, organising 
committees are, for example, set up in the host country of the World Cup. 
Organising committees normally receive a percentage of income raised from that 
particular competition in order to ensure that some funds are available to offset 
the local costs of staging the event.73
5.2 The development of the sports broadcasting sector 
When football was first broadcast on television in the 1950's, it was considered by 
many to be a good means of promoting the sport, whereas others saw it merely as 
a threat to attendance figures in the arenas. However, the demand for sports 
broadcasting has grown enormously and the number of events that are broadcast 
increases year by year. This section of the thesis intends to describe the role and 
importance of sports rights in the broadcasting industry.
69 The other five confederations have members associated from Asia, Africa, Oceania, South America and from 
CONCACAF (North America, Central America and the Caribbean).
70 The Regulations on European Cup Winners’ Cup and Article 1(1) and (2) of UEFA Cup Regulation provide 
that the national champions of the UEFA member associations take part in the European Champions’ Cup 
matches. The respective national winners take part in the Cup Winners’ Cup. The UEFA Cup usually consists of 
the teams placed between no. 2 and no. 5 in the national leagues of the biggest footballing nations: Germany, 
Italy et cetera. Apart from the finals of the Champions’ Cup and the Cup Winners’ Cup, all rounds of the three 
cup tournaments are played both as home and away matches.
71 See Townley, & Grayson, Sponsorship o f Sports, Art and Leisure: Law , Tax and Business Relationships 
,supra note 68 , p. 21.
72 Ibid. pp. 18-19.




























































































5.2.1 The supply and demand side
Until recently, sports rights were frequently in the hands of monopolistic sellers 
and purchasers. The sellers were mostly the national federations controlling the 
television broadcasting rights to all matches taking place on their territory.74 In 
the case of the World Cup and the European Football Championships, the rights 
were sold by FIFA, and UEFA respectively. The rights for other matches taking 
place in European countries were sold by the various national football 
associations. The purchasers of these rights in Europe were, to a great extent, the 
national public service broadcasters. Broadcasters with a public mission are 
usually members of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), which was 
established in 1950 with its headquarters in Geneva. The EBU created a 
reciprocal exchange system for sports television programmes, called the 
Eurovision system where it members could take part. When a member 
broadcaster produced a sport event taking place on its national territory, it 
transmitted the signal to the other broadcasters within the Eurovision system free 
of charge; in turn, it would then be reciprocally guaranteed access to the signals 
for other events produced by the other Eurovision members.75 However, the EBU 
system has been subject to legal proceedings by the European Court of Justice, 
with the result that private broadcasters without a public mission can now have 
greater access.76 Today, due to deregulation in the broadcasting sector, there is 
intensive competition between public and private broadcasters. Moreover, sports 
rights agencies acting as intermediaries between sports bodies and broadcasters 
for the sale of television broadcasting agreements, entered the scene at the 
beginning of the 1990’s, intensifying competition for sports broadcasting rights 
even more.
5.2.2 The characteristics o f the rights
The television rights to sport events may be sold in different ways; indeed, these 
have to be determined by contract. The rights may be exclusive - that is, the rights 
to a certain event may be granted to a sole broadcaster - or non-exclusive. 
Moreover, they may be world-wide or limited to a defined territory. The time 
when the event is broadcast and to what extent it is broadcast are also important; 
the rights may be to live coverage or deferred, and may also include the whole 
event or a certain number of minutes in the form of highlights. Sports rights are 
most commonly sold as exclusive rights limited to a certain area; as such, this is 
an acceptable business practice that is well related to the characteristics of the
74 Cf. UEFA Statutes, Article 14.
75 See Commission decision of 11 June 1993, IV. 32.150EBU/Eurovision system. OJ 1993 LI79/23, at 26-40.
76 See Case C-320/96 P, O.J. 1996, C354/18 annulling judgment of the Court of First Instance of 11 July 1996 in 
joined cases T-528/93, T-542/93, T-543/93 and T-546/93 between Métropole Télévision SA, Reti Televisie 
Italiane SpA, Sociedade Indepcndente De Comunicacao (SIC), Gestevision Telecinco, and Antena 3 de 
Television v Commission of the European Communitiles, European broadcasting Union, Radiotelevisione 




























































































rights.77 The exclusive nature of the rights makes it possible for the broadcaster to 
recoup the money invested in the production and in most cases to make a sound 
profit. The necessity of exclusivity is also related to the ephemeral nature of 
sports broadcasting in distinction to for instance certain films which may be 
shown on television over and over again. Moreover, sports broadcasting rights 
constitute, together with film rights, a significant weapon in the ratings war 
between television channels in order to attract viewers and/or advertisers. 
However, if the scope and/or extent of the rights are excessive78 - because, for 
example, the world-wide rights for an important event are usually granted to one 
broadcaster for several years at the time - serious barriers to entry onto the sports 
broadcasting market may be created. Consequently, the Commission has 
established a certain practice as to what may be considered as reasonable in this 
context.79
Due to the development of sports programming as an essential part of television 
supply, the views on sports broadcasting agreements have changed drastically in 
the Community during the last few years. The football broadcasting agreements 
have turned from being agreements where the effect was regarded as insignificant 
- and one in which sport was considered as just another kind of television 
entertainment, substitutable by other programmes - to be considered as an 
important market of its own.80
5.2.3 The different markets for sports broadcasting deals
There is no direct relationship between the television rights sold by sports 
organisations and the television viewers, because broadcasting requires access to 
broadcasting rights; the reference to sports broadcasting may therefore indicate 
the existence of two different markets. The distinction which follows is presented 
as a theoretical model; it is not generally applicable but the definition of the 
relevant market depends on the parties and the factual circumstances in each 
single case, that is, the substitutability of the products. The first market to be 
recognised is the market for the sale of sports broadcasting rights from the sport 
bodies to either sport agencies, acting as intermediaries, or directly to
7 See e.g. van Miert, Karel, Sport et concurrence, développements récents et action de la Commission, Revue du 
Marché Unique Européen 4/1997, p. 10.
78 In 1989, the Commission for the first time held, in the ARD decision, Decision 89/536EEC of 15 September 
1989, ARD, OJ L284, 3.10.1989 (also called “ Film purchase by German TV stations ") that agreements relating 
to exclusive television rights can be contrary to the Communin' competition rules because of the number and the 
duration of these rights.
79 Normally the rights shall not cover more than one season but exemptions from Article 85(1) may be granted 
for contracts which are justified for developing a new technology, see Draft notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of 
Council Regulation No 17 (OJ No. 13, 21.2 1962, p. 204/62) concerning a notification in Cases No IV/33.145 - 
IT VA (the Independent Television Association) /Football Authorities and No. IV/33.245 - BBC (British 
Broadcasting Corporation), BSB (British Satellite Broadcasting) and Football Association, OJ C94/6, 3.4.93 and 
Report on Competition Policy 1993, Annex III p. 459, BSB/Football Association, where the Commission states 
that it granted an exemption through a comfort letter for the notified agreement.
80 Televising of Dutch professional football in the Netherlands constitutes a relevant market; see KNVB, supra 





























































































broadcasters, the sports rights market. From the rights market derives the second 
market, that is where these rights are broadcast, the sports broadcasting market. 
The suppliers to the rights market are the sports bodies. The demand side consists 
of either broadcasting companies or sports rights agencies. The suppliers on the 
broadcasting market are broadcasting companies. Since the relationship between 
supply and demand requires that a price be paid, the demand side may be 
constituted by paying television viewers in relation to certain cable television 
channels or through pay-per-view television. In the case of satellite television, the 
demand side does not consist of the viewers, but of the advertisers to whom 
advertising time is sold. Whether the markets shall be limited to access to the 
rights and/or broadcasting of football, sport in general, or entertainment in 
general, depends on the demand and supply substitutability in each case.81
81 See Commission notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purpose of Community competition




























































































Chapter 6 -Who has the rights to a sports event?
6.1 Introductory remarks
When a sporting event takes place, a fundamental question arises: which of the 
entities involved should be granted the right to dispose of the broadcasting rights 
to the event? This is a complex issue due to the number of entities that exists on 
different levels of the sports hierarchy and which are involved to various extents 
depending on the context of the game. In order to analyse this problem, it must be 
considered as to which of the entities involved in creating a match, which is 
broadcasted on television, has priority, and on what grounds it thereby should be 
attributed the right to sell the rights to broadcast the event. There are different 
theories regarding ownership. Should one, in this context, refer to the legal 
philosopher John Locke, for instance, who considered that “every Man has a 
Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The 
Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly His”82? 
Whose “Body” should then be referred to in the context of football, since there 
are various actors that act, to a different extent, when a football match takes 
place? For example, take the question of a European league. The football players 
in the two teams are constituent parts of the actual performance. The match takes 
place in the arena of the home club which has undertaken all of the organisational 
tasks and has thus taken the economic risk. The national federation has set up the 
players scheme and, finally, the continental association, in this case UEFA, has 
established the cup competitions and the rules for them. In order to analyse this 
problem, the nature of broadcasting rights has to be established; thereafter, the 
existing regulations on broadcasting rights and the solutions established by 
jurisprudence are examined in turn. Another issue is thus raised: does the rights 
owner have legal right to protection within the context of the organised sport 
event. Such a right is not covered by any legal intellectual property conventions, 
nor is it covered by any national legislation except for an arena-right which exists 
under Brazilian law; however, this question falls outside the scope of this thesis.83
6.2 The nature of the rights
Some questions arise regarding the nature of rights: what is the nature of the 
broadcasting rights which are subject to commercial transactions and 
assignments? Indeed, are any property rights or intellectual property rights 
connected to an organised sports event? It is clear that, when the event has been 
broadcast on television, the broadcaster gains an intellectual property right84 over
82 Locke, John, Two Treatises o f Government, (1690) ii 22.
83 See Law on the Rights of Authors and Other provisions (No. 5.988 of December 14, 1973) and comments by 
Antonio Chaves in Arena Rights - Legislative Problems Concerning Broadcasting o f Large Shows (Sports or 
Other), Copyrights, Geneva, 1987, Vol. 23 pp. 310-319.
84 Copyright protection for broadcasting includes generally protection from someone without permission: 
copying the broadcast or cable programme; issues copies of it to the public, shows or plays it in public, 




























































































it, protecting it from other players recording the transmission and retransmitting 
it. However, what is the status of the event before it has been broadcasted, that is, 
who has got the right to sell it to the broadcaster?
Property as defined, or rather not defined, in the legislation of most Member 
States refers to the legal relations between people and things and constitutes 
anything that can be owned. Thus, property is not a definite concept, but may be 
divided into categories of which the most important distinction which is often 
drawn is between real property and personal property; where real property is land 
or land other than leasehold and personal property is the rest. However, a sports 
event does not fall within any of the categories of property that are commonly 
defined in European jurisdictions, due to their ephemeral nature and to a lack of 
intellectual creation. Nevertheless, although it is not a property right, the 
organiser, in the legal sense, has a right to dispose of the sports event and, when it 
does not want to dispose of it may assign that right to someone else through a 
licence. This view is well illustrated by decisions taken in the German courts.
In 1985, the German Sports Federation and thirty-eight of its associated 
federations concluded a five-year agreement with the German public television 
broadcasting organisation for the broadcasting rights to any sports event 
organised within Germany by these federations. The legality of this agreement 
was examined in the case Global vertrag (Global contract).85 The German 
Federal Supreme Court rejected the view that the granting of transmission rights 
could be understood as the transfer of property. It held that the organiser was not 
entitled to any intellectual property rights over the sports event, as distinct from 
the presentation of a performing artist ( Section 81 of the Copyright Act). The 
German Supreme Court asserted that, for the protection of their economic rights 
and depending on individual cases, the organisers might resort to tort law or to 
unfair competition. It thus concluded that permission for an organiser to transmit 
a sports event via TV-broadcasts does not constitute a transfer of rights in the 
legal sense, but that it is instead a consent to infringing activities which the 
organiser could prohibit by means of the rights to which the reference already has 
been made.86 The same view was taken by the Berlin Court of Appeals when 
examining the right to the television rights of a football match in the DFB case; 
here it held that “[t]he authorisation to broadcast sports events is not based on the 
acquisition of an exploitation right, but on an undertaking of the organiser in the 
legal sense not to assert its rights of action” 87 Following an appeal in the DFB 
case, the Federal Supreme Court defined that “[t]o this participation of the clubs
85 Berlin Court of Appeals of 8 July 1988, AfP 1989/466, Federal Supreme Court, decision of 14 March 1990,
NJW 1990/2815, Global vertrag.
86 Federal Supreme Court decision of 14 March 1990, NJW 1990/2815, Global vertrag, at 2817, referred to by 
Arnold Vahrenwaid, in [1995] 1 ECLR, R-18-19.





























































































in the creation of a market for the assignment of TV rights to football matches 
corresponds the special right to ward off interference with property rights 
(Abwehrrechte) arising from section 1 of the Unfair Competition Act and the civil 
law provisions protecting absolute rights which the home club can assert to 
prevent recordings and transmissions. ”88
6.3 Depending on the circumstances, there are various existing rules 
which regulate sports broadcasting rights
There exist at present various rules within the sports organisations that regulate 
the ownership to sports broadcasting rights. However, there are judicial solutions 
that have questioned these regulations.
6.3.1 National leagues
The question of who owns the broadcasting rights to matches in national leagues 
is normally regulated in the statutes of the national federation or in separate 
regulations.89 90These rights are often conferred to the national federation itself, 
which then sells the rights collectively. However, in France the national sports 
associations have been granted by statute a monopoly as the organiser of matches 
in their respective disciplines and are thereby also attributed the ‘ownership’ of 
the ensuing broadcasting rights.9(1
Moreover, since the league matches are usually broadcast in other countries, there 
is also an interest in Article 14 of the UEFA statutes which, regulates intra-state 
broadcasting in Europe.91 UEFA Article 14(1) provides that “UEFA and its 
member associations hold the exclusive rights to authorise the audiovisual and 
broadcasting transmissions or reproductions of events which take place within 
their respective area of responsibility, as well as any other use and distribution by 
whatever audio-visual and sound broadcasting media, whether the transmission 
be live or deferred or of full length or in excerpts.” Furthermore, UEFA Article 
14(2) states that these “above-mentioned principles shall be implemented by 
special regulations ..., which in particular, shall govern the rights and obligations 
concerning the exploitation and international transmissions of televised pictures 
among the owners of the rights and other national associations.”92
88 Decision of the Federal Supreme Court of 11 December 1997, DFB, supra note 3, at B.I.5.b aa.
89 As is developed in Part 111 of this thesis the attribution of rights to the national federation for the collective sale 
of rights has been subject to competition law scrutiny ; see regarding the Dutch football association KNVB, supra 
note 65; proceedings against the Premier League are pending in the Court on Restrictive Trade Practises, see 
Communication from Office of Fair Trading, No 6/96, 6 February.
90 Loi No 84-619 of 16 July 1984 Relative à Inorganisation et à la promotion des activités physiques et sportives, 
as amended by Loi no 92-652 of 13 July 1992, ( JCP 1992, éd G. III, 66523) which granted to the national 
associations a “mission de service public” and granted them the ownership for events which they organise.
91 Article 14 of the UEFA Statutes provides the mechanism for regulating crossborder transmission of football. 
However, the operation of this Article has been controversial and has led to complaints coming before the 
European Commission in cases taken bv certain television broadcasters (TESN (Case IV/33.742) BSkyB (Case 
IV/33.245), and ITVA (Case IV/33.145)'




























































































Additionally, UEFA Article 1(1) of the implementing regulations reads as 
follows: “UEFA, its member associations, affiliated organisations and clubs holds 
the exclusive TV rights to football games within their respective area of 
responsibility.”93
However, it seems that this provision is not intended to regulate the ownership of 
the broadcasting rights, but merely allows the national associations to have the 
possibility of denying the right to broadcast a match from another football 
jurisdiction at the same time as a game is being played in their country. UEFA 
explained, in a letter to the Commission dated 6 August 1993, that “ [t]hese texts 
are not intended to regulate the question of which entity owns the television rights 
to a football match. In other words, they do not create ownership rights nor take 
them away. Whatever entity owns the television rights to a particular game or 
games will continue to own that right after the new text of Article 14 and the 
Broadcasting Regulations have come into force.”94 *
In practical terms UEFA has, through Article 14 of its Statute, granted a 
monopoly to the relevant national federation in each of its member states to 
determine to which broadcaster in that particular country the broadcasting rights 
for matches played abroad may be sold. At present the Commission is examining 
the provisions because of several complaints from broadcasters.93
6.3.2 Matches between national teams
When a national team is playing against another national team, this match 
competition is organised by the two national football associations. Naturally, the 
broadcasting rights for each individual match is usually granted to the home team.
6.3.3 European Cups
The television broadcasting rights to the finals of the European Cup Winners’ 
Cup and the European Champions Cup, as well as the Champions League of the 
European Champions Cup, belong to and are marketed by UEFA.96 For the 
remaining matches of the European Cups - the European Champions Cup, 
preliminaries, as well as the other matches in the European Cup Winners’ Cup 
and the UEFA Cup - UEFA provides no regulations regarding the ownership of 
the broadcasting rights. However, pursuant to the regulations, the home club 
concerned is responsible for organising their tie.97 Although, on one hand, the 
home clubs bear the entire organisational expenses - for example, the hiring of the
53 UEFA implementing regulations, version of September 1993.
94 See letter from UEFA referred to in Decision of the Cartel Division of the Berlin Court of Appeals of 8 
November 1995, DFB, supra note 59, which refers to Vol. II, p. 14, 164 of the FCO files.
' Another disputed pail of the provisions provided for the regulation of crossborder transmission wherefore it 
provides open, closed and deferred time slots.
See Bundeskailellamt, 6th Decision Division 2 September 1994, 13 6-747000-A-105/92, WuW/E BKartA 
2682, (“Fuflball-Femsehubertraugungsrechte I”), DFB at A.1.3.




























































































stadium and the salaries of the players, trainers, coaches and managers - it can, on 
the other hand retain the revenue from such a game. If a game does not take place 
owing to force majeure, the clubs involved share the organisational and travel 
costs. Furthermore, the home club must take out third-party liability insurance 
and renounce any claims to damages from UEFA. Although the visiting club 
receives no remuneration for participating in a tie, its economic interests are 
protected by the fact that it is the organiser of the return game. UEFA operates 
certain amounts of its services through the national member associations. 
However, the interpretation as to who has the right to the broadcasting rights to 
European Cup matches varies in different countries. In, for example, Italy, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, the broadcasting rights to a home match have 
regularly been sold on an individual basis by the organising club.98 In Germany, 
to the contrary, the DFB sold the rights collectively for the participating clubs and 
divided the income between all the clubs in the league; in turn, this led to action 
by the Bundeskartellamt.99
6.3.4 The World Cup
Article 49 of the FIFA statutes regulates the relations between television and 
radio transmissions. FIFA Article 49(1) provides that “FIFA, its member 
associations, confederations and clubs own the exclusive rights to broadcasts and 
transmission of events coming under their respective jurisdiction via any 
audiovisual and sound broadcasting media whatsoever - whether live, deferred or 
in excerpts.”100 This article is equivalent to UEFA Article 14. However, as is the 
case in the UEFA statutes, this does not give any indications in substance as to 
who is the legal organiser, and thus owner, of different events. The broadcasting 
rights for the World Cup are owned by FIFA as the main organiser, although the 
organising committee in the host country takes care of the practical 
arrangements.101 In general, the ownership of international sport events is a matter 
for negotiation between the international federation and the national association 
of the host country.
6.4 The judicial approach - two main theories
There are two main theories on how the right to an event should be attributed that 
may be derived from existing case law and also from the opinions of legal 
scholars. The first one, which is mainly put forward by German and Dutch courts, 
is that the correct holder is the organiser, due to its entrepreneurial risks and tasks.
*  Ibid, a! B ill. 3.b.dd.
"Ibid.
100 FIFA Article 49(1).
101 The world-wide exclusive rights for the World Cup 1998 were sold to the International Television 
Consortium co-ordinated by the European Broadcasting Union for 230 million Swiss francs. The consortium also 
held the rights for the 1990 and 1994 World Cup Finals. The rights for the 2002 and 2006 World Cup have been 
granted to Sporis/Kirch group. The guaranteed offer for 2002 is 1.3 billion Swiss francs, plus a share of excess 





























































































The second, which is more rarely practised, consists of recognising that the 
organiser has the right to the broadcasting rights which - due to its ownership 
and/or control of the corporeal property - means the stadium where the event 
takes place. The club which holds control of the stadium thereby has the 
possibility of setting the conditions for the use of its facilities, thus refraining 
from using its right to televise the event but instead granting this right to someone 
else in return for a financial contribution. The two theories that are examined in 
the following sections are referred to as the “entrepreneurial theory” and the 
“corporeal theory”.102
6.4.1 The "entrepreneurial theory"
The entrepreneurial theory focuses on the right which is attributed to the entity 
that takes the organisational and economic risk for the event, and not the entity 
that merely handles the administrative tasks or in whose name the event is 
organised. These definitions are well illustrated in Germany through the case law 
which has developed via the Federal Supreme Court.
The first thing to establish is relatively straightforward: who is the organiser in 
the legal sense? This is important to determine because it is to this entity that the 
broadcasting rights must be attributed. The Bundeskartellamt and the Berlin 
Court of Appeals applied this theory when assessing whether the home club or 
the DFB held the broadcasting rights to the home legs of ties involving German 
clubs playing in the European Cup Winners’ Cup and UEFA Cup.103 The Berlin 
Court of Appeals held that “[i]t is the clubs hosting the football game concerned 
in a stadium owned or used by them which are the organisers in the legal sense 
and thus the owners of the rights. An organiser in the legal sense is responsible 
for organising and financing the event concerned, that is, who is charged with 
preparing and carrying the risk.” It referred in this instance to case law 
established by the Federal Supreme Court.104 It proceeded in its opinion by 
holding that in European Cup games, subject to this proceeding, that the owner is 
therefore the home club concerned. This finding was based on the fact that the 
home club has to provide the essential organisational conditions for holding the 
games; it continued “in particular it has to make available a site that meets the 
requirement and to ensure the smooth functioning of the game. Above all, it bears 
the economic risk.”105
The Amsterdam Court of Appeals dealt with the question of ownership in a 
judgment from 6 November 1996 in a proceeding between the KNVB and one of
102 There are no defined vocabulary for these theories since they are not much debated in legal doctrine but the 
definitions are created for the purpose of this paper.
103 See Berlin Court of Appeals of 8 November 1995£)FB, supra note59, at II.B.2.
104 BGH 27/264, 266 ''Boxprogrammheft”, 39/352. 354 “VortragsabendBGH GRUR 1956/515 “Tamkune " ,  
BGHNJW 1970/2060 "Bubi Scholz.




























































































its member clubs, Stichting Feyenoord of Rotterdam. It came to the conclusion 
that the home club is the organiser in the legal sense and, therefore, the club is the 
entity which is entitled to sell the television transmission rights for matches in the 
Dutch professional football leagues.
6.4.2 The “corporeal theory"
One writer argues that “[i]t is a fact that the club concerned, or the promoter, of a 
public event has a recognized right of ownership, or at least a corresponding right 
of enjoyment, over the stadium or venue where the event is held”.106 Indeed, this 
author is also of the opinion that, since the corporeal object where the event takes 
place is under the authority of the promoter, it is therefore up to that person to 
define the conditions of access to it.107
The Commission also put the corporeal theory forward in the EBU'/Eurovision 
systems decision stating that television rights are normally held by the organiser 
of a sports event, who is defined as the person that is able to control the premises 
where the event takes place 108 However, if the subject of the case had been the 
ownership of the sports broadcasting rights, and not the existence of the 
EBU/Eurovision system, it is possible that it would have developed the subject 
more and used another argument.
6.5 A third solution - rights imposed by legal statute
Besides these judicial solutions, there is also a third way of attributing rights - 
that is by legal statute. This is the current situation in France, and it used to be the 
case in Spain too although that legislation has now been abolished.
6.5.1 Legal rights granted to the organiser under French legislation o f 1992 
The right of an organiser is protected by law in France.109 This provision confers 
upon one national association within each of the different sports the right to 
organise international, national or regional competitions within their discipline. In 
France, any other entity that organises a competition must ask for permission 
from the national association. The legislation also states that the broadcasting
106 See Ascensao, de Oliveira. J. The right over an entertainment or event. Copyright bulletin, Paris, Vol. XXIV, 
No. 2, 1990, p 5
107 Ascensâo, de Oliveira, J., The right over an entertainment or event, supra note, 106, pp, 5 and 10. It should be 
noted that he further puts forward the view that: “The fact that an event may be free is not a decisive criterion. 
For events taking place on public land we must distinguish between those for which a right of use has been 
granted to promoter and those not subject to his or her authority. A procession moving along a street does not 
confer any right on anyone. A free recital by a famous singer in a park constitutes an event that belongs to the 
enterprise that organises it and gives it to the spectators.” In addition, he comes to the conclusion that the 
organiser of the event is entitled to a neighbouring right to intellectual property rights which he bases upon 
custom, see ibid. p. 12.
108 EBU/Euro\>ision systems. Commission decision of 11 June 1993, supra note 75, at 22.
109 Law of 1984 as modified in 1992. Loi No 84-619 of 16 July 1984 Relative à l ’organisation et à la promotion 





























































































rights belong to the organiser of the event.110 A fundamental question arises: do 
the rights of the ‘organiser’ as previously defined, refer to the national association 
or to the organising entity? In practice it has been the French Football Association 
- Fédération Français de Football (FFF) - together with the French Football 
League - League National de Football (LNF) - which have signed the contracts 
for broadcasting rights to the matches of the French Football Championship and 
the French national league - Coupe de France - as well as matches of the French 
national team; however, the French teams taking part in the various European 
competitions had the option to assign their rights or to sell them on an individual 
basis.111
6.5.2 The former Spanish legislation o f 1990
In Spain, the Royal Spanish Football Federation used to negotiate the sale of 
broadcasting rights on behalf of the clubs; however, taking into account the 
changes that were taking place in the professional football sector, the football 
clubs were invited to found an association to take care of their common 
interests.112 Consequently, the National League of Professional Football (LNFP) 
was established in 1983. The Sports Law that was established in 1990113 assigned 
to the LNFP the right to undertake certain economic activities, amongst which 
were the rights to receive and to negotiate the financial revenues obtained from 
the sale of broadcasting rights for football matches organised by the LNFP or in 
collaboration with other club associations. This right was granted for an initial 
period of twelve years.114 15It was established in a competition law case in 1993 
regarding compliance with the Spanish Competition Act upon the collective 
granting of the broadcasting rights for, inter alia, the Spanish league - there was 
no legal dispute, since the legislation granted the ownership of the television 
transmission rights to the LNFP.113 After that the decision, which was never 
actually implemented, lapsed, some clubs started to negotiate individually for 
their broadcasting rights. This was due to the fact that football clubs in Spain 
have since completed a financial restructuring, in the process becoming Public 
Limited Sports Companies. Thus, transitory provision 3 of the Sports Law from 
15 October 1990 is no longer in force, and the clubs can therefore individually 
negotiate their broadcasting rights.116
1,0 See Article 18(1), ibid., Loi No 92-652 du 13 juillet 1992.
111 See Théophile, D. & P. Philipp, Football et droits de retransmission télévisée en France: les limites de 
l'exclusivité, JCP, Ed. entreprise, 1992, No.5, p. 30.
11 ‘ See OECD, Competition Issues Related to Sports, Roundtable on Competition policy' No. 11, OECD Working 
papers No. 62, Vol. V, OECD, Pans 1997, p. 61.
,13 Ley 15 October 1990, Num. 10/1990, published in B.O.E. 17 October 1990, no. 249.
114 As long as the so-called Plan de Saneamiento del Futbol is in force
115 Tribunal di Difesa di Competition, Resolution of 10 June 1993, Case 319/92.
116 See OECD, Competition Issues Related to Sports, Roundtable on Competition policy No. 11, supra note 112, 




























































































6.6 Concluding remarks - the attribution of rights to a sports event
As it has been shown, the question of ownership regarding broadcasting rights is 
not an issue that is necessarily easy to resolve. At least, it has been undisputedly 
established that the players do not have any claim to the broadcasting rights. They 
are remunerated for playing the game according to the terms of their contracts, 
but they have no further claims on the broadcasting rights to a match. It seems 
reasonable that the international sports federation holds these rights ultimately; in 
the case of football, FIFA owns the broadcasting rights to the finals of the World 
Cup as FIFA runs the overall organisation. Nevertheless, it still has to share this 
right by contractual arrangement with the host association. However, for the 
qualifying rounds the national associations take care of the organisation in their 
respective home countries and thus they are attributed the rights. The same 
procedure accounts for the matches in the qualifying rounds of the European 
Football Championship. This is in line with current practice. With regard to 
European club competition matches which are marketed by UEFA, on the 
contrary the rights are usually given to the home clubs which take upon 
themselves the whole economical and financial risk of organising the game. It has 
been argued that entrepreneurial theory is the best way of assessing this. Since the 
national federation only has a role in setting the dates for the matches, there is 
nothing which thereafter gives the right to broadcast games. On the basis of this 
entrepreneurial analysis, it is argued that ownership belongs to the home club if it 
can be established that it takes the organisational and economic risks, because 
thereby it may be considered as the legal organiser. However, the right to 
broadcasting rights may not be conferred upon the club that hosts the game 
merely on the basis of it exercising ultimate control over the stadium. The 
outcome of such an analysis must obviously be different if it is not the hosting 
club but, for example, the national association which takes upon itself the role of 
legal organiser. It is argued in this thesis that it is only in this case that the 
national association may claim any right to control of the broadcasting rights.
A joint sale by the national association of the rights belonging to the individual 
clubs is not in compliance with se\'eral national competition acts and although, it 
has not yet been determined, it is also probably not in compliance with the 
Community’s competition rules, an argument which is developed in Part III of 
this thesis. The most complicated question remains in relation to who owns the 
rights to the national leagues. It is argued that if the home clubs have to uphold all 
of the economic costs and take all the risks, as well as taking upon themselves the 
whole organisation of those competitions, then the rights belong to them. If, on 
the other hand, the national federation acts as the entrepreneur of the league to a 
great extent, then the rights may instead be attributed to it. Nevertheless, it seems 
that the rights conferred upon the French national association, and which used to 
be conferred upon the Spanish national league, do not take this reasoning into 




























































































French legislation to be changed, considering the outcome of several competition 
law decisions. The previous analysis on ownership of broadcasting rights focused 
on football, but could be applicable to other professional team sports as long as 
the same underlying conditions prevail. As is demonstrated in Part III, in cases 
where the collective sale of broadcasting rights may be justified, it is still 
possible, for example, for a national football association to sell the rights 
collectively. However, the factual circumstances in any specific case must then be 
taken into consideration. The more interest that sport retains and gains from 
television viewers and advertisers, the less likely it is that collective sales will be 
accepted; however, this only means that clubs which are the original owners of 





























































































A COMPETITION LAW ASSESSMENT OF THE COLLECTIVE SALE 




























































































Chapter 7 - Prohibition on cartels
7.1 Introductory remarks
There is no Community case law regarding, or any assessment of, the extent to 
which football clubs constitute cartels.117 However, some important cases have 
been brought at a national level. The first case in this area was brought in 
Germany by the Bundeskartellamt in 1994 and another decision was recently 
taken by the Ministerie van Economische Zaken; a third case is pending in the 
United Kingdom (UK) in the Restrictive Trade Practices Court. The assessment 
of a league cartel is therefore presented in conjunction with a case study of the 
decision taken by the Bundeskartellamt,118 recently confirmed by the Federal 
Supreme Court, prohibiting the German Football Federation from collectively 
selling the broadcasting rights to European club games. Comparisons are then 
made between this case study and a second which follows the reasoning within 
the Dutch Ministerie van Economische Zaken (Ministry of Economic Affairs). 
The summaries of these cases are followed by an analysis of the legal issues 
raised. Thereafter, this thesis’ focus is turned across the Atlantic in order to 
examine the U.S. approach towards pooled broadcasting agreements. Since that 
solution is rather different to the ones found in Europe this U.S. antitrust analysis 
creates an interesting basis for the concluding chapter on the future assessment 
regarding sales of sports broadcasting rights in Europe.
7.2 The concept of a cartel
A horizontal cartel between competitors is recognised as one of the strongest 
ways of restricting competition. Although there are no per se prohibitions under 
E.C. competition law119, horizontal cartels are often regarded as incompatible 
with Article 85(1).120 The same thing happens with national competition acts. 
Looking at the anti-competitive effects of a cartel, it is not surprising that cartels 
are often found illegal under competition rules, simply because they are an 
effective way of restricting competition. Korah argues that when cartels were 
lawful, in the days before the establishment of the Common Market, one of the 
most effective forms of cartels was the formation of a joint sales organisation 
wherein members gave up their own marketing practices in favour of the joint 
organisation.121
117 Although cases have only been brought at a national level thus far, the Commissioner responsible for 
competition, Karel van Miert, has expressed his concern about this practice, See Karel Van Miert, published 
speech Sport et Concurrence: Developments récents et action de la Commission, supra note 10, alt van Miert 
Sport et concurrence, développements récents et action de la Commission, Revue du Marché Unique Européen 
4/1997, pp. 10-11.
118 Bundeskartellamt 6th Decision Division 2 September 1994, DFB, supra note 96.
119 See Case T-17/93, Matra Hachette v Commission, [1994] ECR 11-595, at 85.
120 See Korah, Introduction to EC Competition law and practice, supra note 37, pp. 172-177.




























































































7.3 Should natural cartels be accepted?
Football leagues are natural cartels, because otherwise they would not exist.122 
The question is, to what extent the league should be considered a cartel from a 
competition law perspective? When assessing the role of the league as a cartel, 
certain limits must be established. A football league can not justify every 
behaviour by claiming that it is necessary for the league; clearly, restrictions of 
competition that are not necessary shall be prohibited. At the same time, some 
behaviour that restricts competition must be permitted for the very survival of 
those leagues. The theory of uncertainty of outcome plays an important role in the 
assessment of the economics of sports, since it explains the necessity of balance 
between the clubs; thereby, it is also an essential factor in the legal assessment of 
cooperation within a league. If competition law is applicable to sports bodies, the 
question becomes: to what extent must a league be prohibited from functioning as 
a cartel and, thus, to what extent must the European Courts and national courts 
intervene in situations where the football clubs or their federations act in a way 
which has the objective or the effect of distorting competition? When the 
financial balance between the clubs is discussed, reference is mostly made to 
regulations regarding players transfers, how gate fees should be divided, and how 
this may create inequality between the clubs; on the other hand income from 
television rights agreements are referred to as an external source of revenue.123 
The question becomes one of whether the income from the sale of broadcasting 
rights, with its increasing economic importance, should be considered essential 
because of the uncertainty of outcome analysis and, thus, allow the collective sale 
of broadcasting rights by the national associations to be permitted, or whether 
such behaviour should be considered as an anticompetitive cartel?
122 Cf. supra. Chapter 2
123 Sloane, P. Spoi l in the Market? The Economic Causes and Consequences o f the ‘Packer revolution supra 




























































































Chapter 8 - Assessment of cartel behaviour-  
the Deutscher FuBball-Bund case
8.1 The prohibited practice
On 2 September 1994, the Bundeskartellamt prohibited the DFB from centrally 
marketing the television transmission rights to home matches of German football 
clubs playing in the UEFA Cup and the European Cup Winner Cup’s 
competitions. The DFB had granted the exclusive TV broadcasting transmission 
rights for the matches for a period of six years - the 1992-93 until 1997-98 
seasons - to two sports rights agencies, UFA Film- und Fehmseh GmbH (UFA) 
and ISPR Internationale Sportsrechtever-wertungsgesellschaft mbH (ISPR). 
These agreements were based upon the television transmission rights conferred to 
the DFB according to Section 3 of its Lizenzspielerstatut (LSpSt) (Licensed 
Players’ Statute).124
The Bundeskartellamt held that the DFB’s practice of centrally marketing the TV 
transmission rights to European home matches of German football clubs was 
likely to effect considerably the conditions on the German market for television 
broadcasting transmission rights of sport events and, thus, that it constituted a 
violation of the ban of cartels imposed by the Article 1 of the German Act against 
Restraints on Competition.125 The Bundeskartellamt prohibited the DBF from 
continuing to implement the rules of the Licensed Players’ Statute, on which it 
based its marketing activity. The decision was upheld by the Berlin Court of 
Appeals on 8 November 1995126 and by the Federal Supreme Court on 11 
December 1997.127
8.2 The factual background: marketing of TV broadcasting rights
The organisational pattern of football has already been previously described.128 
However, some background information can be added; the DFB is associated 
with the regional football associations in Germany, the Regional- and 
Landesverbande. The football clubs of the first and second national leagues, that 
is the Bundesliga and the second Bundesliga, - the Linzenzligen - are in turn 
associated to these regional associations and are thus indirect members of DFB.129
124 Sections 3(2) and (6) of the LSpSt, in the version adopted by the DFB Executive Committee on 22 April 
1989, contains provisions on the granting of audio-visual and sound broadcasting rights. The relevant provisions 
reads as follows: Section 3(2) states: “The DFB owns the right to conclude contracts concerning TV and radio 
broadcasting transmissions of domestic and international championship games with professional league teams.” 
Section 3(6) states.” If only professional league clubs may take part in the game, the negotiations are conducted 
by the League Committee, otherwise by the DFB managing Committee, in the case of main rounds of the DBF 
cup, with the participation of representatives of the League Committee.”
125 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbesch, published in Bundesgesetzblatt, BGB1, 20 February 1990 at 235 (hereafter 
“Act against Restraints on Competition”).
126 Decision of the Cartel Division of the Berlin Court of Appeals of 8 November 1995, DFB, supra note 59.
127 Decision of the Federal Supreme Court of 11 December 1997, DFB, supra note 3.
128 See supra, Chapter 5.




























































































Up to recently, the winner of the Bundesliga has participated in the Champions’ 
Cup, whereas the teams which finished in the next four or five positions of the 
Bundesliga have participated in the UEFA Cup, unless they won the national cup 
competition, in which case they qualified for the European Cup Winners’ Cup. 
The German clubs participating in the European competitions had until the end of 
the 1986-87 season marketed their own broadcasting rights individually. But, 
since the 1989-90 season, the DFB has centrally marketed the TV broadcasting 
rights to these home games. Initially, that is until seasons 1991-92, these rights 
were granted either individually or as a package to sports agencies or TV stations. 
Thereafter, most of these rights were granted as a package to spoit agencies for 
the whole season. UFA and ISPR were, in annual rotation, between 1992-93 and 
1996-97, granted exclusive world-wide (with the exception of Italy and Monaco) 
TV broadcasting rights for the whole season, for which they each paid sixty 
million Deutschmarks per season. This package did not include the rights to the 
final matches of the European Champions’ Cup or, the European Cup Winners’ 
Cup, or, indeed, the games of the Champions' League in the European 
Champions’ Cup because theses matches are all centrally marketed by UEFA.130
At the time when the clubs sold the rights individually, they kept all of their 
income, except for ten per cent which was transferred to UEFA, in accordance 
with the Statutes of the different European club competitions.131 When the DFB 
took over the sale of rights from the football clubs, it continued to transfer ten per 
cent of the revenue accrued from the television transmission rights to UEFA. The 
remaining 90 per cent was shared out between the participants in the European 
competitions and the remaining clubs of the two Bundesliga Of that balance to 
the participants and the other Bundesliga clubs, 20 per cent went into the so 
called ‘live pool’ which is shared between the clubs of the Bundesliga and second 
division of the Bundesliga on a 70:30 basis. This remainder was also shared in a 
way which reflected the success achieved by the participants; the rest was shared 
out in equal amounts between the German clubs that had not qualified for the 
European competitions. If a German club was eliminated from a competition at an 
early stage, the amount available in the live pool thus increased proportionally.132
8.3 Application of Article 1 of the Act against Restraints
on Competition to the collective sale of broadcasting rights
The DFB argued unsuccessfully that the Act against Restraints on Competition 
was not applicable to it because DFB operates as a non-profit sports association 
and was not engaged in a business activity, as well as its view that the clubs were 
dependent on each other, and that they were not competing on an economic
130 Ibid, at A.1.3
131 Ibid, at A.1.3




























































































level.133 The Bundeskartellamt rejected this argument and held that the football 
clubs constituted undertakings within the meaning of the Act against Restraints 
on Competition and that the DFB acted as an association of undertakings by 
taking decisions that influenced the economic activity of the professional league 
clubs.134 It proceeded to state that central marketing limited competition on the 
German market with regard to the television transmission rights of sport events, a 
finding which it based on the following argument.133 It stated that the German 
clubs that had qualified for the European competitions are considered as 
competitors in relation to their supply of broadcasting rights to their home 
matches.136 The Bundeskartellamt submitted its view that the collective sale of 
these transmission rights, as based upon the relevant provisions in the 
‘Lizenzspielerstatut’, forecloses competition between the clubs, both in regard to 
the price and to the conditions of sale.137 Moreover, it held that individual clubs 
lose their contractual freedom because they are deprived of the opportunity to sell 
the broadcasting rights to their European home matches individually or as a 
package, and because they also lost the possibility of determining the conditions 
for their subsequent transmission.138 The product market on which competition 
was restrained was defined by the Bundeskartellamt as the market for TV 
broadcasts of sports events, a product market in which the suppliers are the 
organisers of sports events and one in which the TV stations or the sport agencies 
act as buyers.1'1' The geographic market had already been defined as sovereign 
territory of Germany.14" Although the Bundeskartellamt did not consider the 
broadcasting of football matches to be a separate market, it remarked upon the 
importance of football as a source of television programming, emphasising that 
TV rights to football events in Germany are clearly more important than other 
sport events.141 The Bundeskartellamt recognised football matches to be of 
special importance to the buyers; this was due to the fact that the attractiveness of 
sporting events to spectators is high and because the expected amount of 
advertising revenue depends on the viewer ratings.142
The Bundeskartellamt proceeded to assess each of the three main justifications for 
the collective sale of broadcasting rights that were put forward by the defendant,
DFB:143
133 Ibid. at b .ii i .:
134 Ibid. at B.III.2.
Ibid. at B.III.3.a.
136 Ibid. at B.III.3.a
137 Ibid. at B.III.3.a
138Ibid. at B.III.3.a.139 Ibid. at B.III.4.
140 Ibid. at B.I.






























































































(i) it is the DFB, and not the clubs which is the rightful holder of television 
transmission rights;
(ii) the league constitutes a single product and is marketable as such; and
(iii) the financial viability of the league depends upon the collective sale of the 
broadcasting rights.
All of these arguments were rejected by the Bundeskartellamt on the basis that 
they withheld the restriction on competition; these were based upon the following 
conclusions.
8.3.1 The clubs are holders of the broadcasting rights
An assessment of the legality of collective marketing of broadcasting rights 
primarily depends upon determining who is the organiser in the legal sense and 
thereby the holder of the broadcasting rights. The DFB tried to argue that UEFA 
or DFB were the rightful owners of the rights to the matches, therefore, there was 
no breech of Article 1 of the Act against Restraints on Competition.144 The 
Bundeskartellamt held the contrary view, stating that the clubs are entitled to 
these rights as the organisers of their respective home matches.145 The 
Bundeskartellamt referred to the concept of organiser as established by the 
Federal Supreme Court in previous case law.146 The organiser is, according to 
those judgments, the entity responsible from an organisational and financial point 
of view, that is the body or person that organises the events and thus takes the 
economical risks for it. Having established this fact, the Bundeskartellamt 
examined the actual situation regarding the organisation of European club 
competition matches.147 According to the regulations for these tournaments, the 
home clubs concerned arc responsible for organising their own game.148 Each 
club bears the entire organisational costs of a home match and also keeps the 
revenue from such a game. If the match is cancelled due to force majeure, it is the 
participating clubs which bear the costs for the organisational and travel 
expenses. The clubs are obliged to take out third-party liability insurance and to 
refrain from any claim for damages from UEFA.14'7
Considering these facts, the Bundeskartellamt came to the conclusion that the 
individual clubs alone - thus, neither the DFB nor UEFA - bear the 
entrepreneurial risk involved in organisation. Thus, the home club is the original 
and rightful holder of the television broadcasting rights. 150 The Bundeskartellamt 
proceeded to examine whether DFB or UEFA could be attributed any rights as 
co-organiser, but concluded by denying them this role and the consequent role as
"“ Ibid, at A III
145 Ibid at B III 3 B
146 Ibid at B.III.3b.aa
147 Ibid at B III.3 b.bb - B ill 3 .b.cc.
Ibid at A.I.2.b.
149 Ibid, at B Illb  bb i




























































































co-rights holder.151 It based these findings on its consideration that the national 
federation and UEFA merely have an administrative task and the responsibility 
for the rules of the game, while the economic risk for the matches themselves 
remained with the participating clubs.152 It further observed that any argument 
that the DFB or UEFA, through its organisational contributions, should have the 
rights as the individual organiser was a contradiction. The Bundeskartellamt 
pointed specially to the fact that the home clubs receive the money charged for 
gate entrance. It noted that, in the logic of DFB, the football association should 
also have the right to this income, which is of course not the case. The conclusion 
that was therefore drawn was that only the home club is considered as the 
organiser in a legal sense, thereby it is the sole holder of the broadcasting rights 
for its home matches.153
8.3.2 The matches are separate products - not only parts o f the league
The parties involved in the defence invoked its view that the European club 
competitions had created a special and new product, whose organiser in the legal 
sense was the DFB or UEFA.154 Moreover, the DFB argued that the individual 
matches had no value on their own, and that the services to which the television 
broadcast related was the competition as a whole rather than individual matches. 
The Bundeskartellamt did not accept this argument, but held that, despite the 
existence of the league the matches are separate events and marketable as such.155 
To support this view, it took into account the fact that previously the broadcasting 
rights had been sold on an individual basis by the German clubs participating in 
the European tournaments. Furthermore, it emphasised the fact that broadcasting 
rights to European matches in other countries - such as England, Italy, and 
Sweden - are sold individually.156
8.3.3 No justification for collective sale due 
to the financial viability o f the league
The Bundeskartellamt proceeded to debate the argument put forward by the DFB, 
claiming that collective sales were indispensable for the survival of the league 
and/or the European cup competitions.157 The Bundeskartellamt found that the 
collective sale of rights was not indispensable for the financial viability, either of 
the league or of the individual clubs.158 It took the pragmatic view that the
Ibid, at II III.3 b bb ii - B.III.3.b.cc
l5'  See ibid, at B.III.3-b.cc. The organisational tasks of the DFB includes the following: draw up the fixture list, 
plan the dates for domestic cup matches; change the dates for postponed matches and fix new dates; coordinate 
dates; confirm dates of international games; examine and grant the right to play ; handle the transfers of players; 
and grant licenses and monitor the conditions imposed upon a club during the licensing piocedure.
153 Ibid, at B.III.b.cc.
1SJ Ibid, at B III b dd
155 Ibid. atB.III.3.b.dd.
156 Ibid, at B.III.3.b.dd.
157 Ibid, at B.III.3.C



























































































previous individual sale of rights up to 1986-87 did not seem to have effected the 
financial viability of the league. Moreover, it made a comparison with the 
situation in other footballing nations and found that the financial strength of other 
top football leagues - for example, England, Italy, and Sweden - was not 
threatened by their individual marketing of TV rights to European home 
matches.139 Furthermore, it considered diat there were other differences in the 
income levels between clubs, depending on several factors such as their relative 
geographical location and the interest of the local population in sports; therefore, 
die individual sale of broadcasting rights was not the only determinative factor in 
the club’s economy. The Bundeskartellamt submitted its view that there were 
other, less restrictive, ways of supporting struggling clubs other than selling 
television rights collectively and then distributing the revenue through a ‘live 
pool’. It preferred as an example the possibility of letting clubs sell the 
broadcasting rights individually, but that they could then establish a kind of 
solidarity fund to support the weaker clubs.159 60
8.4 The Bundeskartellamt's decision
After having rejected all of the DFB's justificatory arguments, the 
Bundeskartellamt ruled that the central marketing of television transmission 
rights to European Cup games by the DFB was likely to influence the conditions 
on the market.161 In this case, the relevant market is the market for the televisual 
transmission of sport events, where the suppliers are sports organisations and the 
purchasers are sports agencies or television operators. The market includes all 
sporting manifestations organised by German sports bodies. The collective sale of 
rights appreciably affects competition. The buyers are dependent upon being able 
to broadcast sporting events in order to attract greater number of viewers. Some 
events such as football in general and the European club competitions in 
particular, are more attractive than others. The Bundeskartellamt refused to grant 
an exemption under Articles 5(2) and (3) of the Act against Restraints on 
Competition.162 The Bundeskartellamt thereby prohibited the DFB from 
implementing Sections 3(2) and (6) of the Lizenzspielerstatut and thus the 
underlying decision of the DFB Executive Committee.
8.5 The appellate decisions
Appeals against this decisions are not examined at length in this thesis as both the 
Berlin Court of Appeals and the Federal Supreme Court upheld the 
Bundeskartellamt’s prohibition of the collective sale of broadcasting rights. 
However, some of the points raised by these courts are interesting and are further
159 Ibid, at B.III.3.C.
160 Ibid. atB.III.3.c.
161 Ibid, at B-III.4
162 See Decision of the Cartel Division of the Berlin Court of Appeals of 8 November 1995, WuW/E OLG 5565, 




























































































investigated because they flesh out some of the arguments used in the 
Bundeskartellamt’s original reasoning.
8.5.1 The judgment o f the Berlin Court o f Appeals
The DFB, as well as the sport agencies UFA and ISPR, filed appeals against the 
Bundeskartellamt’s decision. The Berlin Court of Appeals confirmed in its 
judgment of 8 November 1995 that the challenged provisions violated the ban on 
cartels under Section 1 of the Act against Restraints on Competition.163 In relation 
to economic competition between the clubs, the Court of Appeals held that “[t]he 
interest in keeping the league complete does not require that the clubs do not 
engage in economic competition, as long as a sufficient number of clubs are [sic] 
ready and waiting to replace those that are eliminated. It is unlikely that a club is 
forced to drop out during the season, since the DFB admits the clubs to the 
national leagues in a particular season only after examination of their financial 
standing (Section 5(d) of the LSpSt). Moreover, the fact that the clubs - according 
to the appellant's allegations - must be expected to be unwilling to pay part of the 
TV revenue from the European Cup home games into a fund shows that the 
behaviour of the professional league clubs toward each other is dictated by 
economic considerations.”164 With reference to previous German case law, the 
Court of Appeals took the view that the home club was the organiser in the legal 
sense since it is the entrepreneur, and thus, owner of the broadcasting rights.165 
Whit regard to the financial viability of the league it made a distinction between 
the German football league and the European club competitions concluding that 
the stability of the league as such was not endangered by the revenue accruing 
from the broadcasting rights to the European club competitions.166
The Berlin Court of Appeals shared the opinion of the Bundeskartellamt, holding 
that the matches constitute separate products. As an additional proof of this, it 
pointed to the fact that the sports agencies which bought the rights from the DFB 
sometimes sold the rights to individual games. Furthermore, it discussed the 
problem of insecurity for the buyer of the television rights since the interest of 
spectators in these matches depends on how far the German teams were 
successful in the various competitions.167 The Court of Appeals found, however, 
that the purchasers of rights does not gain greater planning regarding 
programming of the matches by buying a ‘package’. This does not reduce the risk 
of the German teams being eliminated. The risk has thus to be appraised by the 
buyer and limited by contractual arrangements. It concluded by stating that, if the 
seller of the rights is an individual club, the obvious solution would be to accord 
payment depending on the number of rounds in the course of the competition
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid, at II.B.2.
165 Ibid, at II.B.2.
166 Ibid, at II.B.2.




























































































reached. Later in its decision, it held that individual marketing appears quite 
possible in view of the large number of buyers interested in acquiring football 
broadcasting rights.168 It also took into account the fact that, as a result of central 
marketing, only a single supplier is left in a specific section of the market.169 
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that there are less restrictive means to ensure 
the survival of weaker clubs. It suggested, inter alia, an internal arrangement 
whereby the top clubs might make a proportion of their revenues available for 
distribution among the weaker clubs.170
8.5.2 The judgment of the Federal Supreme Court
The DFB and the sport agencies concerned - UFA and ISPR - filed appeals on 
points of law against the Berlin Court of Appeals' decision with the German 
Federal Supreme Court. In its decision of 11 December 1997, the Federal 
Supreme Court held the appeal to be unfounded and confirmed the decision of the 
Court of Appeals.171 The Federal Supreme Court held that the provisions subject 
to these proceedings restricted competition within the meaning of Section 1(1) 
sentence 1 of the Act against Restraints on Competition.172 These provisions grant 
the DFB the right to conclude contracts regarding television broadcasting rights 
for the home matches involving German teams in the European club 
competitions. This then eliminated the individual clubs as suppliers of the said 
rights. The appellants had challenged the view that the provisions of the LSpSt 
eliminate competition as well as the conditions for the assignment of the rights. 
However, the Federal Supreme Court rejected this argument. Firstly, the Federal 
Supreme Court examined the ownership of these broadcasting rights. It held that 
the participating clubs were, at the very least, co-organisers of their 
homematches.17’ It based this argument on the fact that the home club is “the 
natural market participant that is entitled to market the services produced by 
acting in a combination with the opponent’s club on a reciprocal basis agreed 
upon.”174 It also considered that, since there is no doubt as to the home club’s 
right to sell tickets and to be involved in other commercial activities in the 
stadium, the same conditions should apply to the granting of TV rights.175 
However, it took a slightly different view than the lower courts on the 
relationship between the home club and the DFB, considering that it does not 
have to define who is the sole owner of the broadcasting rights. It held that the 
home club is, at least, an original co-owner of the rights.176 The DFB was
168 Ibid, at II.B.2.
169 Ibid, at II.B.2.
170 Ibid, at II.B.2.
171 See Decision of the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) of 11 December 1997, WuW/E DE-R 17, DFB. supra note 
3.
172 Ibid, at B.I.S.a.
173 Ibid, at B.I.S.b.
174 Ibid at B I.5 b.aa
175 Ibid at B I.5 b.aa.




























































































considered as having an organisational role, a position which “does not render TV 
broadcasts of football matches possible at all, but merely serves better and more 
marketing”.177 Secondly, the Federal Supreme Court rejected the DFB’s argument 
that the matches in the league constitute a single product, but, instead stressed the 
perception that each match is an individual product. It held that each home match 
is part of an overall competition, but that this fact does not deprive it of the 
character of an event that can also be marketed as such.178 179Nor was it held to be 
true that the games staged in the context of the competition can be marketed only 
as a package. The Federal Supreme Court referred to the fact that, the sport 
agencies that acquired the broadcasting rights as a package from the DFB 
marketed these rights separately, which it thus held as evidence to the contrary
. 179argument.
It should be noted that, towards the end of its decision, the Federal Supreme 
Court commented upon the relationship between competition law and internal 
sports policy rules. It stated that “[ijnsofar as the DFB and its members are 
market participants in their capacity as enterprises and also market professionally 
run football matches by granting TV broadcasting rights for a high remuneration, 
they also have to observe the limits drawn by the ARC [Act against Restraints on 
Competition] despite broader sports policy goals that are in principle not affected 
by the ban on cartels. Otherwise the purpose of the Act, which is to prevent 
market conditions from being affected by restraints on competition, would be 
largely frustrated. If therefore, the main aim consists in protecting competition as 
an institution and the indirect aim is to safeguard the freedom of action of other 
market participants, the justification for the violations of these goals cannot be 
that socially desirable conduct is financed by higher profits obtained in this 
manner at the expense of market participants.”180
8.6 Comments
At this point, some comments might prove to be useful regarding the various 
courts’ reasoning in the DFB case and the impact of the German Federal Supreme 
Court’s decision for the sports bodies.
8.6.1 The sale o f sports rights
The DFB case is clearly a landmark case in competition law, particularly in the 
area of sports. It was confirmed by the Federal Supreme Court that the DFB is not 
allowed to act as a cartel in relation to the sale of broadcasting rights to the home 
matches of German teams involved in the European club competitions. Although 
this case was brought up at a national, and not a Community, level, in time it will
177 Ibid, at B I.5 b.bb.
178 Ibid, at B.I.S.c.aa.
179 Ibid. atB.I 5.c bb.




























































































most certainly have an impact upon the assessment of similar practices in other 
Member States, particularly because there is no case law from the European 
Community Courts or from the Commission on this specific issue. This theory 
was recently proven by a decision from the Dutch Ministerie van Economische 
Zaken in December 1997 when it regarded the collective sale of broadcasting 
rights by KNVB. That decision, in which the reasoning was to a large extent 
based on the same grounds as that of the German courts’ arguments in the DFB 
case, is analysed later. Firstly, however, some comments on the DFB case.
8.6.2 The organiser concept
The reasoning which underlay the competition law assessment is the civil law 
question on the determination of the legal organiser, in this case that is the entity 
recognised as the holder of the broadcasting rights. Already, there existed some 
well established case law on this question as developed by the Federal Supreme 
Court; therefore the Bundeskartellamt just had to apply the facts of the case. It 
came to the conclusion that the home clubs bear the entrepreneurial responsibility 
and, thus, that they should be regarded as organisers and consequently be 
recognised as the holders of the broadcasting rights. However, the Federal 
Supreme Court did not just content itself by only referring to the lower courts and 
to its own case law, but went further by looking at the logic behind the ownership 
of those rights.181 It appears justifiable that the organiser should bear the fruit of 
its own work and, as was pointed out, if the club has the right to sell tickets to 
spectators for the match and also has all other economical rights, what logic says 
that they should not have the right to sell the television transmission rights?
It is not possible to get around the prohibition on the collective sale of 
broadcasting rights by claiming that the rights have been assigned from the clubs 
to the DFB, and that the DFB thereby should be entitled to enact their collective 
sale on behalf of the clubs. The Berlin Court of Appeals denied the possibility of 
assignment as justification for the restriction on competition, stating that: “[a] 
distinction has to be made between the capacity of organiser in the legal sense 
and the rights of such an organiser which derive from that legal position. Who is 
to be regarded as organiser in the legal sense is determined, as the legal 
consequence, by a complex of constituent elements, in particular the bearing of 
risks. Naturally, the legal qualification as organiser cannot be assigned as such to 
another person. Rather, it can only be changed by changing the underlying 
constituting elements accordingly. But this did not happen in the present case.”182 
It proceeded by going on to state that it is the individual clubs which are the 
organisers in a legal sense; thereafter it held that: “[ijnsofar, an instrument in 
which the illegal conduct materializes or which is part of an illegal course of 
action cannot possibly be considered to have any justifying effect. For the same
181 Ibid, at B.I.S.b.aa.




























































































reasons, any direct assignment of TV rights to the DFB cannot be accepted as a 
justification for the established restraint to competition.”1*3 It is argued here that 
this assessment of the organiser, as the entity undertaking the entrepreneurial 
tasks, is the logical one. Neither UEFA nor the DFB have anything but an 
administrative role to play in organising matches; therefore the football clubs 
should have the rights to sell their respective broadcasting rights. Nor should it be 
possible to get around this, through an assignment of the rights from the clubs to 
the DFB, as the Berlin Court of Appeals correctly pointed out.
8.6.3 Obviously, matches are separate products
There is a peculiarity inherent in sports. Together, the competitors produce the 
products - the matches; at the same time, the matches form a part of another large 
product - the league. It was established in the German courts that the home clubs 
were the rightful holders of the television broadcasting rights to their respective 
home matches. Despite this, however, there was another problem: could the 
matches together be considered as a single product - in the case of the European 
competitions? This argument was rejected by the German courts and looking at 
the facts of the case, it is not difficult to agree with their decisions. The courts 
denied the DFB's view that the matches could only be marketed collectively and 
held, on the contrary, that each individual match has a value of its own and that 
there were several valid arguments which stated that they could be marketed 
separately. The reality of the situation speaks for itself, but it must be said that 
even this argument about the matches being one product appears to be a 
contradiction in itself, especially when taking into consideration the context of 
where the matches in fact take place. These proceedings related to the matches of 
German clubs taking part in two different European club competitions, the UEFA 
Cup and the European Cup Winner’s Cup. Should the matches of the German 
teams then constitute ‘a competition in the competition’? If this logic is followed, 
then all the participating countries should sell the rights for their respective teams 
as packages, which is not the actual case; compare this to the case of participating 
teams from England, Italy and Sweden, who sell their rights individually. 
Stretching this logic even further would lead to the view that it should not be the 
collective sale of the matches of one nation which should be viewed as important, 
but the collective sale of all the matches of these European competitions, because 
the DFB claimed that the individual matches have no independent value. Why 
then should the German matches taken together have a value? This argument is 
applied more logically to a national league, in this case the Bundesliga.
8.6.4 Marketing offootball matches is not comparable with marketing o f music 
The DFB has tried to argue that there is a specific nature to football matches and, 
consequently, that this necessitates selling the matches collectively.183 84 It based its
183 Ibid, at II.B.2.




























































































argument on U S. case law, as established by the U S. Supreme Court decision of 
1979 in Broadcast Music Inc. v Columbia Broadcasting System.185 The subject 
matter of the proceedings in that case was the question of per se illegality 
regarding a ‘blanket license’ for music under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.186 
These licences were issued by Broadcast Music, Inc., (BMI) and the American 
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) for copyrighted musical 
compositions. These blanket licences gave the licencees the right to perform any, 
or all of the compositions owned by its members or affiliates,187 as often as the 
licencees desired, for a stated term.188 By granting licences and distributing 
royalties, the copyright organisations functioned as middlemen between the 
copyright owners and potential buyers.189 In return, they were paid a percentage 
of profits or a fixed sum.190 This system was rejected by the Columbia 
Broadcasting System (CBS), because it claimed that the blanket licence 
constituted an illegal price-fixing agreement between the composers and 
copyright organisations who had joined together in order to determine a set 
price.191 The Supreme Court did not agree with the analysis reached in the Court 
of Appeals, and held that the agreement had to be analysed under the rule of 
reason.192 Under this analysis, the Supreme Court emphasised the procompetitive 
aspects of the blanket licence in the contractual relationship between copyright 
owners and purchasers.193 It pointed especially to simplified negotiations, 
substantially lower costs resulting from fewer negotiations, and an expansive 
choice of compositions.194
The Bundeskartellamt rejected this argument regarding the applicability of U.S. 
case law. It held that the case referred to regarded intellectual property rights to 
music, and stated that an exemption for the collective sale of music is already 
provided for in Article 102 of the Act against Restraints of Competition. The 
Bundeskartellamt also rejected a parallel between the marketing of music by a 
blanket licence in order to protect intellectual property rights to music, and the 
collective sale of football matches. It might be noted that this reference to U.S. 
case law appears to have been a rather desperate attempt by the DFB, especially
185 Ibid, at BIII.3.b.dd, referring to Broadcast Music Inc. v Columbia Broadcasting System, 441.U.S.1 (1979).
186 See Broadcast Music.Inc. 441 .U.S. 1 (1979), supra note 185 at 9-10.
18' The Court noted that almost every domestic copyrighted composition was held by either one party or the 
other.
188 Broadcast Music. Inc. 441.U.S.1 (1979), supra note 185 at 5-6
189 Ibid, at 4-5, 10.
190 Ibid, at 5.
191 Ibid, at 6-8.
192 Ibid, at 19-25.
193 Ibid, at 20-24.




























































































considering that the U.S. Supreme Court did not accept the application of 
Broadcast Music, Inc. for a pooled sports broadcasting rights agreement.195
8.6.5 An assessment o f the characteristics ofprofessional team sports 
A problem in many competition law cases is to prove that there is an anti­
competitive behaviour and/or agreement. This was not a problem in this particular 
case because the football association constituted what is defined as an open cartel. 
The right to sell broadcasting rights was provided for in its statutes; indeed it was 
also openly known diat it sold these rights because such deals are always widely 
reported in the media. The fact that the national football association sold the 
television broadcasting rights to matches that were part of European competitions 
when the actual owner of these rights were and are the individual clubs, is 
considered to be a clear example of horizontal price-fixing. The collective sale 
eliminates competition on prices and on the conditions of sale, because the 
football association has every say in these matters. Not only is competition 
eliminated, but the clubs are deprived of their right to freedom of action. 
Moreover, it has been established that the effect on the relevant market, defined 
as the selling of sports television broadcasting rights, is substantial, because 
football, and especially the European club competitions are considered to be such 
attractive sports events by the initial purchasers, the sport agencies and the 
television operators.
However, it is not sufficient to base an argument regarding a breach of the ban on 
cartels by merely establishing that the clubs are the rightful holders of the 
television broadcasting rights of their home games, and that the national football 
federation therefore constitutes a cartel when selling these rights collectively. A 
competition law assessment must also focus on the prevailing market situation, 
and especially on the specific characteristics of the sports sector’s market 
situation, one in which the clubs participating and competing in a league have to 
cooperate. This is the main distinction that can be drawn between professional 
team sport and other markets. It then has to be analysed whether the product they 
sell justifies a distinction. This raises the question: was this fact taken into 
account to a sufficient extent by the German courts? Indeed, two further central 
questions are: (i) is the collective sale necessary for the financial viability of the 
league; and (ii) to what extent should competition law uphold wealth distribution 
among football clubs, that is are there less restrictive means?
8.6.5.1 Is the collective sale necessary for the financial viability of the league?
An argument equivalent to the one brought forward by the DFB, regarding the 
necessity of restraint on competition due to the financial viability of the league,
195 The application of Broadcast Music, Inc. 441.U.S.1 (1979), supra note 185, was denied in National 
Collegiale Athletic Association v Board o f  Regents o f the University o f Oklahoma el a i, 468 U.S. 85, 113 




























































































could hardly be applied with success in any other part of the economy. It is 
generally considered that firms shall compete unless there is question about 
cooperation in the field of research and development, a sector in which 
cooperation may be permitted in order to promote technological progress. 
Restraints on competition in order to make the competitors survive is usually not 
heard of otherwise. However, this argument is important in a competition law 
assessment of rules concerning sports organisations.
The Berlin Court of Appeals drew a distinction between the European club 
competitions and the two professional German leagues. It held that participation 
in the former is something additional to the national leagues; thus, it is argued 
that the money which is earned through the sale of broadcasting rights is an 
additional income to the money generated through actions related to the national 
leagues. This distinction is important, but it is arguable that it fails to recognise 
the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis. After all, the clubs which take part in the 
league varies, depending on their results in the course of the league season. The 
better the results in the league, the greater the possibility to earn even more 
money as income from participating therein, as well as from qualifications for 
European competitions. However, a team’s success is not only dependent upon on 
its income, but also from the players it manages to hire, their contracts, for 
example, and especially how they perform together - football is, after all, a team 
sport. This thesis therefore agrees that the Court of Appeals made a distinction 
which makes sense. It is not possible to equalise totally the income of teams. The 
question thus becomes: how far should wealth distribution between the clubs be 
permitted?
8.6.5.2 To what extent shall competition law uphold wealth distribution 
among the clubs?
This question calls for a parallel to be drawn with the Bosnian case.196 Although 
the European Court of Justice did not rule on the compatibility of football’s 
transfer system with its competition rules, it might be considered that the DFB 
judgment shows some similarity to Bosnian as both cases have had a certain 
impact on the wealth distribution between football clubs. However, the 
implications of both cases may not be as drastic as it first appeared for the 
football industry. For one thing, the enforcement of a system of wealth 
distribution between football clubs would still be feasible as a result of the ruling 
in Bosman prohibiting the transfer system.197 The same might be said of the 
possibility of wealth distribution between football clubs as a consequence of the 
prohibition on the collective sale of TV transmission rights. It should be noted 
that the explicit terms of neither judgment decides that it is unlawful for the 
football industry to establish its own system of regulation designed to shelter the
196 See C-415/93 Bosnian, supra note 30.




























































































dubs from pure market-based solutions, but only that this cannot bejichieved 
neither through the transfer system nor a sales cartel because it was found to be 
anti-competitive action.198 In addition, what legitimises the cartelisation of 
broadcasting rights if the players, match tickets, and club souvenirs can be sold 
individually or collectively by each club and the revenue kept from them on an 
individual basis or sometimes shared with another team or teams? Indeed, it may 
also be asked: should not all these incomes be put in a central fund and then be 
divided between the different clubs in the various leagues?
The outcome of the DFB decision has been influenced by the actual market 
situation. The Berlin Court of Appeals held that individual marketing appears 
possible since there are several presumptive buyers. As a result of central 
marketing, a single supplier is left in control of a specific section of the market. 
But, a monopoly position is not prohibited as such, only abuse of that position. 
However, if this position is created by a joint sales agreement, this constitutes a 
cartel, which as such then becomes and is defined as anti-competitive. Due to 
deregulation, there is intensive competition between broadcasters and, as the 
courts recognised, football is now an important part of television programming.199 
It is necessary to adapt the sale of broadcasting right to the market situation so 
that the purchasers of the television rights do not have to encounter sale 
monopolies. This is true especially when there are no sport specific needs to 
justify the collective sale because their sole interest is the maximisation of profits. 
A solution whereby the collective sale of broadcasting rights might be prohibited 
is highly pragmatic, especially when taking into consideration, the fact that rights 
were previously sold individually in Germany and the fact that they are at present 
sold on an individual basis both by football clubs in several other European 
countries and, even more importantly by the sports agencies that bought the rights 
from the DFB. To allow the DBF to market the rights in a anti-competitive 
manner having considered these circumstances would have been paradoxical.
8.6.6 The prospects for future litigation -
the relationship between sports policy and competition 
Finally, it is well worth noting the remark put forward by the Federal Supreme 
Court regarding the relationship between sports policy and competition law, 
referred to previously in section 8.5.2 of this thesis. This is a policy remark which 
is worth recurring both in the German competition law decisions, as well as in 
decisions by the Community institutions and in other Member States. The remark 
also resembles a comment made by the Court of Justice in the Bosman judgment
198 Cf. Weatherill, S.; Cowmen! on Bosnian, CML. Rev., 33, 1996 p. 1012.
199 See German courts and the Dutch competition authority which recognised football broadcasting as a separate 





























































































as it held that “this cannot go so far as to diminish the objective character of the 
law.”200
8.6.7 Prohibition on the collective sale o f broadcasting rights -  
should national leagues be distinguished?
The DFB was prohibited from collectively selling broadcasting rights to various 
football matches part of European club competitions. The question is whether the 
same principle may be applicable to the collective sale of broadcasting rights to a 
league? Might it really be required that every team in the league - top or bottom 
ranked - sell their rights individually and not as part of a package? The 
Commission will soon have to deal with this question since the Deutcher FuBball- 
Bund has notified such an agreement under Regulation 17. The notification for 
negative clearance or exemption was published in the Official Journal 9 January 
1999.201 The notification concerns the collective selling of the television and radio 
broadcasting rights for the ‘Bundesspiele’ (that is the first and second Bundesliga 
and the national cup competition DFB-Vereinspokal) The duration of the 
contracts is two years with a possibility of extension. DFB claims, in order to 
justify an exemption, that the central marketing rationalises distribution of the 
broadcasting rights; it serves solidarity between financially stronger and weaker 
clubs by distributing the revenue equally; and it supports amateur and youth 
football wherefore in its opinion collective selling is indispensable. It will be very 
interesting to see what position the Commission will take towards these 
agreements. This is not yet decided at the time of writing but will surely give an 
important indication on such agreements compatibility with Article 85(1). A 
similar situation regarding legality of collective sale of broadcasting rights for the 
national professional football leagues, as examined by the Dutch Competition 
Authority, is analysed in the next chapter.
200 See C-415/93 Bosnian, supra note 30, at 77
201 See Notification on Case No IV/37.214 - DFB - Central marketing of TV and radion broadcasting rights for 




























































































Chapter 9 - National leagues as a cartel - the KNVB case
9.1 The decision of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs
Shortly after the Federal Supreme Court took its decision in the DFB case, on 22 
December 1997, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs decided to prohibit 
KNVB from collectively selling broadcasting rights to the professional football 
leagues in the Netherlands.202 In effect, this decision was a refusal of KNVB’s 
request to grant an individual exemption for the collective sale of broadcasting 
rights. The KNVB had collectively granted the television transmission rights for 
the Dutch first and second leagues to two broadcasters for a total period of two 
and a half years. The disputed rights concerned summaries (to a maximum of 
fifteen minutes per match) and highlights (to a maximum of ninety seconds per 
match), but not the broadcasting rights to live television; these were granted to 
another television company through a different agreement, an arrangement which 
was not subject to the proceedings under discussion here. The Ministry of 
Economic Affairs held that the collective sale of television transmission rights 
constituted a restriction of competition in breach of Article 1(1) of the Act on 
Economic Competition dating from 1956 (Wet economiche mededinging), 
because it restricted competition in the market, for the sale of football television 
transmission rights to broadcasters, by fixing prices and by limiting the 
commercial freedom of football clubs.
It is interesting to note that this disputed agreement became the subject of 
investigation by the Dutch Competition Authority following a complaint from a 
club which was discontent with this arrangement.203 The club claimed that 
broadcasting rights belong to the club organising the match; therefore the sale of 
collective exclusive rights constituted an illegal pricing agreement which was 
prohibited under Dutch competition law. The collective sale, that is where the 
KNVB sets the price, restricts the freedom of the clubs to set their own prices as 
well as depriving them of the ability to sell their own rights themselves. This 
view was challenged by the KNVB, as it claimed that, because it is the organiser 
of all the matches and because it constitutes the league as a whole it was being 
sold as one produce and not as individual matches.
As demonstrated through out the summary of this case and in the forthcoming 
analysis, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs has to a great extent adopted 
the same position as the German courts, but the Dutch analysis varies from the 
German model on some important points.
202 Decision by Ministerie van Economische Zaken of 22 December 1997. KNVB, supra note 65.





























































































9.2 The facts of the case
The KNVB, had in accordance with Article 6(1) of its statutes and Article 59(1) 
of the Reglement Betaald Voetbal (Regulation on Professional Football),204 205by an 
agreement which dated from 6 January 1997, granted the exclusive rights to the 
summaries and highlights of matches in the PTT Telecompetitie (the Eredivisie or 
premier league) and the Eerste Divisie (effectively the second division) to the 
Dutch public broadcaster NOS (Nederlandse Omroeprogramma Stichting) for a 
period of two and a half years. These rights did not include cable television rights, 
pay-per-view rights or radio broadcasting rights, however.203 Moreover, the 
private broadcaster SBS 6 (Scandinavian Broadcasting Systems) was also granted 
rights to highlights of the Eerste Divisie.206 If the broadcasters did not make use 
of these rights within tw’enty-four hours of the last match in that particular round 
of matches, it was stipulated that the rights to broadcast the match would then go 
back to the KNVB and/or to the playing clubs taking part.207
9.3 The legal analysis
This legal analysis concentrates on five major issues.
9.3.1 The clubs as holders o f the TV broadcasting rights
The Ministry of Economic Affairs started by assessing to whom did the television 
transmission rights belong.208 It started to refer to the civil law proceedings in the 
judicial matter at hand, a proceeding against the KNVB which had been initiated 
by the club which had originally launched the competition law complaint. The 
Gerechtshof te Amsterdam (Amsterdam Court of Appeals) delivered its judgment 
on 8 November 1996, concluding that the television transmission rights belonged 
to the home club.209 Thus, the organiser, which was defined as the entity 
responsible both for the organisational and the financial aspects of a match, was 
declared as the rightful holder of the television rights.210 The Ministry of 
Economic Affairs held that the facts of the case showed that the clubs both take 
the burden of preparation and the economic risk involved.211 It also found that the 
role of the KNVB was only to establish which teams were meeting in each round 
of matches, determine schedule of those matches, and decide the rules of the 
league.212 However, it found that the KNVB actually took no economic risk in the 
organisation of the games themselves.213 Moreover, it stated that the clubs took
204 See Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 22 December 1997, KNVB, supra note 65, at 4-8.
205 Ibid, at 13 (Article 2.3 of the Agreement).
206 Ibid, at 17.
207 Ibid, at 16-17.
208 Ibid, at 22.
209 See Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 22 December 1997, KNVB, supra note 65, at 24, referring to 
Gerechtshof te Amsterdam 8 November 1996 (President Rechtsbank Utrecht 19 March 1996) Stichting 
Fevenoord/ Konjlijke Nederlandse Voetbalbond (KNVB).
210 See Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 22 December 1997, KNI B, supra note 65, at 25.
211 Ibid, at 28.
212 Ibid, at 26.




























































































care of ticket sales for their respective home matches. Finally, it referred to the 
reasoning of the Berlin Court of Appeals in its judgment of the DFB case, which 
held that it was the home club which was the rightful holder of the television 
transmission rights.
9.3.2 The matches are separate products, marketable as such
The KNVB argued that a tournament should be considered as one product, and 
therefore that it had to be marketed as such. The same argument was used by the 
DFB in front of the Bundeskartellamt which then rejected that argument, just as 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs did, holding that each individual game is a 
single product.214 It pointed out that the market value of the individual television 
rights may vary, depending on many factors: when the match takes place, which 
clubs are playing, the playing clubs' current positions in the tournament, at what 
time the match is broadcast and the extent of exclusivity of those rights.215 It held 
that the same competition situation which operates between clubs with regard to 
the sale of tickets, the sales and purchases of players, the attraction of sponsors, 
and in regard to merchandising also occurs with regard to the sale of broadcasting 
rights.216 The Ministry of Economic Affairs also stated that it is possible that the 
TV rights for the summaries of less interesting matches would engender a 
substantially lower price.217 Nevertheless, it came to the conclusion that the 
individual sale of rights is still possible due to ongoing developments in the 
broadcasting sector and because of the high number of potential channels which 
might be able to broadcast football matches.218
9.3.3 Discussion about uncertainty o f outcome
In relation to the financial viability of the league, the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs discussed the specific nature of uncertainty of outcome which 
characterises professional football. However, it held that the collective sale of 
television broadcasting rights is not a determinative issue in upholding the 
uncertainty of outcome.219 It submitted the view that less successful clubs might 
be financed in a less restrictive way, than through the collective sale of 
broadcasting rights, by initiating a fund so that the financially stronger clubs 
might finance the weaker ones.220 In this respect, reference was made to Advocate 
General Lenz who, in his opinion on Bosnian suggested that some of the revenues 
from player transfers might be divided up in order to support the struggling clubs, 
obviously in a less restrictive way than through the existing transfer system.
214 Ibid, at 30
215 Ibid, at 31.
216 Ibid, at 31.
217 Ibid, at 32.
218 Ibid, at 33
219 Ibid, at 34
220 Ibid, at 34. Reference was made to the proposal of Advocate General Lenz in the Bosnian case, C-315/93, 




























































































9.3.4 Restriction on competition
The Ministry of Economic Affairs found that the existing collective sales 
arrangements constituted a restriction on competition. Previous agreement had 
granted to the KNVB the right to sell transmission rights to the football leagues 
collectively, creating a joint sales agency on behalf of its members. Such 
collective sales means the horizontal price fixing of all matches, thus excluding 
the possibilities of the clubs individually setting prices. Competition between the 
clubs was therefore limited, because they are deprived of their freedom to set 
prices and to fix their conditions as the sellers of such rights.221
9.3.5 The relevant market
The Ministry of Economic Affairs distinguished a separate relevant market for the 
rights to football broadcasts. It started by recognising that, within the market of 
television rights, there are different sub-markets. It was submitted that sport was 
not substitutable by other programmes which is proved by the existence of 
specific sports channels such as Eurosport and Sport7 222 But, sports rights are 
also essential for more general channels in order to attract advertisers through 
viewing figures.223 The conclusion drawn was that television rights for the 
broadcast of Dutch professional football remains a separate product market224 
The relevant geographic market was held to be limited to the sovereign territory 
of the Netherlands.225
9.4 Exemption refused
The Ministry of Economic Affairs examined whether this agreement might be 
granted an exemption from the prohibition referred to in the competition act 226 It 
came to the conclusion, however, that the criteria for granting an exemption were 
not fulfilled.227 Nevertheless, in order to allow for a transition period, so that the 
actors in the market could prepare themselves for a situation under which the 
collective sale of television rights will no longer be admissible the prohibited 
agreement was allowed to remain in force until 1 July 1998 228 29The Ministry of 
Economic Affairs added, for the sake of completeness, that the temporary 
exemption was only given under national competition law, and that it would also 
expire in the meantime if the European Commission found the agreement to be 
contrary to the E.C. Treaty22'3
See Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 22 December 1997, K\'\ 7i, supra note 65, at 39.
222 Ibid, at 46
223 Ibid at 49
224 Ibid, at 53.
225 Ibid, at 54
226 Ibid, at 67-92.
222 Ibid, at 93
228 Ibid, at 93.




























































































9.5 Comments - a comparison between the DFB and the KNVB cases 
The Dutch judgment goes further than the German one, simply because it 
prohibits the collective sale of, not only some matches in the European club 
competitions but all the matches played in the two professional Dutch leagues. At 
the same time, however, it is also less restrictive, since its decision does not take 
immediate effect as the parties were given a temporary exemption of up to six 
months. The following discussion regarding the restriction on competition in 
these two cases and the reasons for not justifying the collective sale demonstrates 
that the outcomes for Germany and the Netherlands are basically the same in both 
cases.
9.5.1 Market assessment
The point that differs most between the two cases is their respective definitions of 
the relevant market. The Bundeskarteliamt defined the product market as the 
rights to transmit sports events, while at the same time considering that football 
matches have an important position with regard to these rights due to the specific 
interest which exists for this sport amongst both spectators and advertisers. The 
Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs came up with a narrower definition, by 
limiting the product market to the rights for football matches. The narrower the 
definition of the market of course, the more likely that the agreement in question 
will then have an appreciable effect upon competition in that market. Any 
definition of the relevant market therefore has an integral importance in both 
cases. The limitation of the relevant market in the Dutch case to broadcasting 
rights to professional football matches in the Netherlands automatically gives an 
appreciable effect to any agreement; indeed it even creates a monopoly situation 
for the KNVB. In the German DFB case, the Bundeskarteliamt defined a broader 
market, that is the broadcasting rights to sports events in Germany. The impact of 
agreements on televising of UEFA Cup and European Cup Winners’ Cup 
matches might then be questioned when considering the amounts of sports events 
broadcast each year. However, their definition is not as broad as it might sound at 
first, because the Bundeskarteliamt stressed the importance of broadcasting 
football and declared the UEFA matches to “the” event amongst sports 
broadcasting in Germany. With this additional remark the Bundeskarteliamt 
indicates that the broadcasting of football is more important than it first might 
appear and that the effect of DFB’s collective sale thereby results in an important 
effect on the market. The reason why the Bundeskarteliamt did not define the 
product market as football broadcasting must be questioned. Whether these 
definitions become even narrower in future cases - for example, how a market is 
defined for the rights to televise the matches of a the most famous and appealing 




























































































9.5.2 The matches as separate products
In accordance with the German courts, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs 
also considered the matches as separate products. This distinction goes further, 
however, because the games are more likely to be considered as one product 
when they form part of a national league. Nevertheless, this is still more 
reasonable than the situation in the DFB case, where the DFB argued that the 
home matches of the German teams taking part of the European club 
competitions should be considered as one market. Even so, this does not 
necessarily mean that such an interpretation has to be made. Although there are 
specific characteristics regarding the products produced by football clubs, the 
actual market situation demonstrates that there is a demand for such products and 
that they may be marketed separately. As the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs 
pointed out: why should the clubs not compete when selling their television 
rights, especially when they have to compete in ticket sales, the buying and 
selling of players, merchandising, et cetera? As long as there exists a demand for 
matches to be sold as separate products, it argued that they constitute separate 
products and thus they may be marketed as such. Therefore, it is not necessary to 
make any distinction between the collective sale of European matches and the 
matches that takes place in the national league. However, as in any competition 
law assessment, there are no general solutions. A hypothetical situation might 
arise in which, for example, there is not enough interest between the broadcasters 
to buy the football rights individually, thus risking the financial viability of the 
league; however, this might be because probably football is a relatively minor 
sport in that particular country and, therefore there is no risk necessarily of any 
appreciable effect on the larger sports rights market. If football is a sport that does 
not attract much attention the market should not be defined as the football rights 
market but sports rights market or television entertainment
9.5.3 The less restrictive solution
The German and the Dutch competition authorities came to the same basic 
conclusions. They both found that the clubs are holders of the rights and, indeed 
that they should be competitors in the sale of those rights in the same way as they 
are competitors in every other sense, with regard to ticket sales, attracting 
sponsors et cetera. In both cases the prohibition of collective sale originated from 
the fact that, although there has to be a degree of uncertainty in outcome, this may 
not be upheld by the collective sale of television transmission rights, a practice 
which sets prices and thus restricts competition between the teams. The 
determining factor appears to have been that there are less restrictive ways of 
upholding the uncertainty of outcome; for example, by initiating the suggested 
loyalty fund. Wealth distribution as such is not prohibited but a wealth 




























































































Chapter 10 - Application of U.S. antitrust law to the sale of broadcasting 
rights agreements
10.1 Introduction
Due to the long tradition of antitrust enforcement in the U.S. - the Sherman Act 
was established in 1890 - there is often good reason to refer to U.S. antitrust 
jurisprudence when assessing areas of European competition law, mainly because 
interesting parallels may occasionally be drawn from its application. However, it 
should still be recognised that, although both competition law systems have as 
their overriding consideration the protection of competition in favour of consumer 
welfare, there are some great distinctions. Parallel to the protection of 
competition, there is, within the European Community the additional aim of 
enforcing market-integration between the Member States; this leads to different 
solutions being reached in the two systems, for example, in the area of vertical 
restraints. Moreover, there are obviously different policy aspects which influence 
the respective antitrust enforcing bodies and which then leads to diversity in 
assessment.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that: “[ejvery contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among 
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”230 However, 
not every restraint of trade is illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, only 
those which are unreasonable. The U.S. Supreme Court has developed a practice 
wherein certain restraints are found to be so unlawful that they are considered as 
per se illegal, that is without the court having to go into any justifying reasons.231 
Among the agreements that are considered per se illegal are horizontal cartels, 
group boycotts, resale price maintenance and horizontal price fixing. The 
agreements which do not fall within the category of being per se illegal or do not 
need to be examined because they are considered as per se legal agreements, are 
analysed under a rule of reason analysis.232 The courts then analyse whether the 
agreement threatens to raise prices or to reduce output; it also estimates the 
market power of the parties, assesses whether the agreement is ancillary, and then 
sees whether there are any proportional efficiencies. All of these factors are 
weighed together in order to establish whether the agreement must then be held to 
be unlawful or not.
Antitrust has been applied to the sports sector since the 1920’s. There was really 
no debate regarding the applicability of antitrust laws to sport. What is 
paradoxical, however, is the fact that baseball was granted an exemption from
230 Sherman Act [15. U.S.C. §1],
231 Standard Oil Co. v United Stales, 221 U.S. 1,60 (1911).




























































































antitrust laws in 1922 in Federal Baseball,233 principally because Justice Holmes 
declared that professional baseball was not a federal business that involved 
intrastate commerce. Although there has been a lot of criticism regarding the 
illogicality of treating baseball differently to any other form of sport no court has 
since overruled the Federal Baseball judgment.234 That this general immunity 
would not be extended to any other sport was clearly held in relation to American 
football in Radiovich v National Football League in 1957.235 
This section examines whether the application of U.S. antitrust towards the 
collective sale of sports broadcasting agreements might cast any light upon the 
approach taken by the courts in Europe. Although it is not possible to do an 
outright comparative study between the decisions in the U.S. and the ones given 
in Germany and the Netherlands, primarily due to U.S. legislative intervention in 
this area, it is nevertheless interesting to look at the main precedents and to 
examine the legislative exemption in the U.S.
10.2 The antitrust exemption for broadcasting agreements 
regarding professional sports leagues
The application of antitrust to television contracts of the National Football 
League (NFL) began with an antitrust action brought by the Department of 
Justice against the NFL in 1953, when the compatibility of Article X of the 
NFL’s by-laws with Section 1 of the Sherman Act was questioned.236 The 
provisions, which were subject to the proceeding concerned were analysed under 
the rule of reason. The federal district court found that several of the provisions 
regarding blackout of games when a team played away from home constituted 
unreasonable restraints of trade, because they could not protect the levels of live 
attendance at the arena, the justifying argument which was put forward by the 
defendant.237
The NFL’s collective sale of broadcasting rights to American football matches in 
the NFL were condemned by the same district court in 1961. In April 1961, the 
NFL entered into a contract with CBS which required that each “club will pool its 
television rights with those of all of the other clubs, and that only the resulting 
package of pooled television rights will be sold to a purchaser.”238 This agreement 
was thus prohibited as an unreasonable restraint of trade.239 This judgment met 
with a lot of protest because other professional sports leagues were engaging in
33 Federal Baseball Club o f Baltimore, Inc. v National League o f Professional Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 
42S.Ct. 465, 66 L.Ed. 898(1922), 39, 57.
234 Cf. Toolson V  New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 74 S.Ct. 78, 98 L.Ed 64 (1953) 57 and Flood v Kuhn, 407 
U.S. 258, 92 S.Ct. 2099, 32 L.Ed.2d.728 (1972), 56, 57.
' Radiovich v National Football League (NFL), 353 U.S. 931 (1957).
236 United Stales v NFL, 116 F.Supp 319 (E.D.) Pa. 1953.
™ Ibid. at 326-27.
United States v NFL 1% F. Supp 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961).




























































































substantially similar agreements to the prohibited practice of the NFL.240 Instead 
of letting the relevant bodies take antitrust action against these other leagues, the 
U.S. Congress enacted legislation to provide for an exemption from the antitrust 
laws in order to permit a professional league to sell package deals to broadcasting 
companies for the exclusive transmission of games, the Sports Broadcasting Act 
of 1961.241 The legislative history of the Sports Broadcasting Act appears to 
indicate that a main concern, when the Act was enacted, was the financial 
viability of the NFL.242 The NFL argued that they had to make package sales “to 
assure the weaker clubs of the league continuing television income ... on a basis 
of substantial equality with the stronger clubs.”243 Television revenue was held to 
be “such a significant part of the overall financial success of a professional 
football team”, that it was “necessary to prevent too great disparity in the 
television income of the various clubs.”244 Moreover, it was stated that “should 
the weaker teams be allowed to flounder, there is danger that structure of the 
league would become impaired and [the NFL’s] continued operation 
imperiled.”245
10.3 Television plan regulating college football
found illegal under the rule of reason - the NCAA judgment 
While the Sports Broadcasting Act exempts the joint promotion of sports rights 
for professional football leagues from antitrust rules, similar kinds of agreements 
have been held to be illegal under the rule of reason, for example when enacted 
by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). This was established by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in NCAA v Board o f Regents in 1984, when television 
rights were subjected to a collective plan which restricted both price and output, 
as well as the commercial freedom of the participating teams.246
10.3 .1 Facts o f the case
The NCAA was established in 1905 and is a non-profit self-regulatory 
organisation, which runs amateur collegiate sports.247 In 1981, it had 
approximately 850 member-schools, of which less than 200 played American
240 S Rep. No. 1087, 87lh Cong., 1st. Sess. 3 (1961) reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N 3043, (hereafter Senate 
Report) referred to by Anderson, David L., The Sports Broadcasting Act: Calling It What It Is - Special Interest 
Legislation, Hastings Comm/Ent L.J., Vol. 17, Summer, 1995, p. 945 - 959.
241 The Sports Broadcasting Act, Pub. L. No. 87-331 (15 U.S.C §§1291-95) Section 1291 provides an exemption 
from antitrust laws for agreements covering the telecasting of sport contests: “The antitrust laws... shall not 
apply to any joint agreement by or among persons engaging in or conducting the organized professional team 
sports of football, baseball, basketball or hockey, by which a league of clubs ... sells or otherwise transfers all or 
any part of the rights of such leagues' members clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games ...engaged in or 
conducted by such clubs."
242 See Senate Report, supra note 239, at 3043.
243 Ibid, at 3043
244 Ibid, at 3043.
245 Ibid, at 3043
246 National Collegiate Athletic Association v Board o f Regents o f the University o f  Oklahoma et a/., 468 U.S. 85 
(1984), supra note 195 (hereafter NCAA v. Board of Regents).




























































































football in Division 1. In 1971, the NCAA had established a ‘Television Plan’ 
stating that its Football Television Committee would be responsible for regulating 
the NCAA’s programming of American collegiate football and television policy. 
A new television plan was adopted in 1981 and it is that plan that later became 
subject for judicial proceedings. This plan regulated the televising of NCAA 
football games for the 1982-1985 seasons. This plan recapitulated that like its 
predecessors, it aimed to “reduce, insofar as possible, the adverse effects of live 
television upon football game attendance”.248 This plan also granted the television 
committee the rights to negotiate and to contract NCAA games to two U.S. 
television networks. Accordingly, the NCAA entered into a four-year contract 
with the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) and the CBS.249 250Additionally, 
it entered into a contract with Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., for the exclusive 
rights to broadcast matches on cable television.230
The television plan limited the total number of games to be televised, as well as 
the maximum number of games to be televised involving any one school. 
Moreover, each network agreed to pay a minimum aggregate compensation. No 
members of the NCAA were permitted to make any other sales of television 
rights except in accordance with this television plan.251 However, the networks 
negotiated with the schools as to which game to televise. Some of the members 
schools, which together formed the College Football Association wished to sell 
the rights according to their own conditions, and thus established a separate plan 
and initiated an agreement with a television network outside of the original 
television plan. The NCAA thus threatened them with disciplinary sanctions.252 253
Then, however, two of the universities involved, Oklahoma and Georgia, initiated 
an antitrust proceeding in a U.S. Federal District Court.
10.3.2 The lower courts'judgments
This District Court found that the television plan violated Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.233 It held that the market competition for live college football 
television rights was restricted in three ways: (i) by price fixing; (ii) as a group- 
boycott against all other potential broadcasters; and (iii) through a restriction on 
output.
The U.S. Court of Appeals held that the television plan constituted per se illegal 
price fixing.254 It rejected the NCAA’s justifying arguments that the plan actually 
promoted live attendances, that it balanced athletic competition, and that the plan
218 Ibid, ai 85.
249 Ibid, at 92.
250 Ibid, at 93.
251 Ibid, at 92-93.
“ 2 Ibid, at 94.
253 546 F.Supp. 1276.




























































































was needed in order to compete effectively with other forms of television 
programming.255 256Finally, it held that, even if the plan was not per se illegal, the 
anti-competitive effects on price and output were not met by any justifications
• • °56promoting competition.'
10.3.3 The assessment of the Supreme Court
The U.S. Supreme Court analysed the agreements in two steps. Firstly, it 
determined whether the NCAA’s action were illegal under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. The majority verdict found that the plan between horizontal 
competitors enacted horizontal restrictions.257 It also held that the NCAA’s 
arrangement had limited the freedom of the member schools to sell their own 
television rights.258 Moreover, the Court found a restriction on output, holding 
that more games might have been televised on the open market rather than under 
the NCAA plan.259 It also found that the plan constituted horizontal price 
fixing.260 It held that the price was higher and the output lower than they would 
otherwise have been; therefore it stated that “both are unresponsive to consumer 
preference” and added such an effect “is not consistent with [the] fundamental 
goals of anti-trust law.”261
The Supreme Court confirmed the District Court’s definition of the relevant 
market as the market for the televising of live college football. The Court based 
its findings on the fact that there are no specific substitutes for televised collegiate 
football television programming simply because it generates an audience which is 
uniquely attractive to advertisers.262 These findings were thus held to support the 
fact that the NCAA alone possessed this specific market power.263
By tradition, horizontal cartels are considered per se illegal, that is, without the 
court having to look for possible justifications. The Supreme Court decided, 
however, to assess the plan according to a rule of reason analysis,264 because the 
case involved an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are 
essential if the product is to be available at all.265 It recognised that the NCAA 
plays a vital role in enabling college football to preserve its character and, “as a 
result [enabling] a product to be marketed which might otherwise be 
unavailable.”266
255 See 707 F.2d. at 1153-1154.
256 See 707 F.2d. at 1157-60.
257 See NCAA 468 U.S. 85 (1984), supra note 195, at 98.
258 Ibid, at 99.
259 Ibid, at 99.
260 Ibid, at 99
261 Ibid, at 106.
262 Ibid, at 110-112
263 Ibid, at 110-112.
264 Ibid, at 100.
265 Ibid, at 100.




























































































The Supreme Court denied the applicability of the joint selling arrangement that 
was permitted in Broadcast Music, Inc., since the NCAA did not function as a 
selling agent that promote competition because it limited prices and output.267 The 
Supreme Court held that most of the NCAA’s regulatory controls are justifiable 
means of fostering sporting competition. However, it did not recognise the 
television plan as having the same effect. The Supreme Court thus held that the 
NCAA imposes a number of other restrictions which are better suited to 
amateurism than the television plan.268 In addition, it noted that no other NCAA 
sport was subject to a similar television plan.269 The Court also emphasised the 
District Court’s finding that more games would be televised in a free market than 
were being shown under the television plan. The Supreme Court’s final holding 
determined that as this plan was “curtailing output and blunting the ability of 
member institutions to respond to consumer preferences, the NCAA has restricted 
rather than enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics in the Nation’s life.”270
10.3.4 Comments on the NCAA case
A strong dissenting opinion to the majority opinion in the Supreme Court was 
written by Justice White, an opinion which Justice Rehnquist shared.271 The 
dissenting opinion held that the majority opinion erred in finding that the NCAA 
arrangement fixed prices and limited output.272 Justice White took great account 
of the inherent and constituent nature of the NCAA, holding that its arrangement 
was justified because it maintained interaction between college athletics and 
academics. This dissident view criticised the majority opinion for using an 
improper measure of output and for not to demonstrating that there was an anti­
competitive increase in price.273 Finally, he held that the arrangement was 
sufficiently competitive under the rule of reason and that the non-economic goals 
underlying the arrangement - the integration of academics and athletes, the 
maintenance of a competitive equality between the teams, and the continued 
viability of academic programme through the income engendered by football 
broadcasting rights - were the results that should have lead the majority view to 
find that such restraints were reasonable.274 Despite the criticism put forward by 
the dissidents, it is argued here in this thesis that the NCAA arrangement was 
anti-competitive, just as the majority opinion held it to be. As H. Hovenkamp puts 
it, the Court of Appeals rightly rejected the NCAA’s argument that the 
arrangement promoted competition in a different market, that is the market for
261 Ibid, at 113.
268 Ibid, al 119.
269 Ibid, at 119.
2,0 Ibid, at 120.
271 NCAA, 468. U.S. 85, supra note 195, dissenting opinion bv Justice White joined by Justice Rehnquist at 121 - 
136
272 Ibid, at 128- 129.
273 Ibid, at 129.




























































































live attendance of football games. He is of the opinion that any restriction of 
output in one market tends to increase the demand in markets for substitute 
products.273 Nevertheless, he also states that “[s]trong arguments have been made 
that the Supreme Court defined the market too narrowly, and that televised 
professional football, or televised sports, should have been considered the 
appropriate market for antitrust analysis.”276 The role and aims of the NCAA can 
be fulfilled without its television plan. This is, inter alia, proven by the fact that 
American college football is the only sport for which the NCAA used to sell the 
rights collectively; in other sports, these rights were sold on an individual basis by 
the schools. The Court did not find that the NCAA’s arrangement promoted 
competition enough to justify the restraints on prices and output. The important 
factor is that, although the NCAA has an important role as the promoter of U.S. 
academic sports, it may not restrict competition with regard to the broadcasting 
rights market of such sports because there are less restrictive ways of supporting 
the weaker teams than by fixing prices and limiting output. This is the same 
argument which underlies the German and Dutch DFB and KNVB judgments.
10.4 Concluding remarks on the U.S. antitrust approach 
towards sports broadcasting agreements
To finish this look at the U.S. experience, perhaps it is necessary to make some 
concluding remarks.
10.4.1 There is a discrepancy in the antitrust treatment o f collegiate 
and professional sports
Due to the Sports Broadcasting Act U.S. antitrust law does not apply to the 
collective sale of broadcasting rights agreements for professional sports. 
Although the sports sector not exclusively has a commercial profile, it seems odd 
that the broadcasting agreements, undoubtedly one of the most economic of 
activities which the clubs pursue be exempted from the application of antitrust 
legislation, especially in the case of professional sports. Although this legislation 
was enacted in order to uphold the financial viability of the leagues, it is peculiar 
that this could not be ensured by means which are less anti-competitive and 
which do not require an antitrust exemption. This Act has created monopolies 
within the different markets for sports broadcasting rights to the detriment of 
consumers; after all, they are the ones who have to pay the costs incurred by 
resulting profits. This view is supported by many, including a legal writer who 
holds that the time to change the subsidy granted to the NFL, due to the antitrust 
exemption, has come. He argues that this subsidy has enabled the league to enjoy 
the huge profits which accrue from television at the expense of the advertisers - *276
t75 Hovenkamp, H., Federal Antitrust Policy - the law o f competition ami its practise. Hornbook Scries, West 
Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1994, p 238.




























































































and, therefore the consumers too who pay for the broadcasts277; therefore the 
exemption should be amended and limited to negotiating pooled television rights 
for playoff games as regular season games would then be negotiable by individual 
franchises. The same writer further argues that the benefit of this amendment 
would be immediate as the price paid for the NFL’s television rights would 
almost certainly fall.278 Reference is also made to the decrease in fees paid for the 
television rights to the NCAA games due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s prohibition 
on collective sales agreements; the fees paid by the networks for the rights to their 
games dropped from $74.2 million in 1983 - the year before the Supreme Court’s 
decision - to $52.7 million by 1986.279 The Sports Broadcasting Acts appears to 
be even inappropriate considering the outcome of the NCAA judgment. Indeed, it 
may be disputed as to why the application of antitrust laws should be harder on 
collegiate sports than they are on professional ones. This seems to be an 
unjustified discrepancy. Nevertheless, despite this discrepancy between the 
antitrust treatment of collegiate and professional sports, and the fact that the 
economic environment for football clubs has changed since 1961, a legislative 
change in the U.S. appears unlikely.
10.4.2 The Single Entity Theory is not applicable to sports leagues 
Finally, it should also be mentioned that some scholars argue that a sports league 
must be treated as a single entity, referring to a doctrine according to which 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is not applicable to cooperation between a parent 
company and its wholly owned subsidiary. The single entity doctrine was 
established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Coppenveld,280 when it held that a 
parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary are not legally capable of 
conspiring with each other in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Some 
scholars try to argue that Coppenveld should be extended to encompass “unique” 
joint ventures,281 such as professional sports leagues, since the member teams 
cannot produce their product without the “integration and cooperation of each and 
every member of the league”.282 Although each team is independently owned, the 
league shares a “unity of interest”,283 which is to promote league competition and 
to maintain the economic well being of every club.284 Within the realms of this
277 See Brown, Charles S., Professional football and the antitrust laws: impact of United States Football League 
v. National Football and a proposal for change, Saint Louis University Law Journal, Vol. 31, 1987, p. 1079.
278 Ibid. p. 1080.
279 Ibid. p. 1080, note 143, citing Lancaster, Colleges Scrambling to Avoid Loss In a Glutted TV Football 
Market, Wall Street Journal, 23 September, 1986 at 37, col. 50.
280 CoppenveldCorp. v Independence Tube Corp. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
281 Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust and the Single Entity Theory, A Defense o f the 
Status Quo, 66 Indiana Law Journal, 25, 30 (1991), at 120.
282 Gary R. Roberts, The Single Entity Status of Sport Leagues Under Section I of the Sherman Act: An 
Alternative View, 60 Tulane Law Review, 562 (1986).
283 Jacobs, supra note 280, at 33.
284 NASL v NFL, 670 F.2d. 1249, 1253 (2d. Cir. 1982) “Damage to or losses by any league member can 
adversely affect the stability, success and operation of other members”, United States v NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 




























































































logic, the Sports Broadcasting Act is not needed, because a professional sports 
league is a single entity and, therefore, cannot violate Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act. However, it appears that this theory is misapplied when used in conjunction 
with professional sports leagues, an argument which is supported both by U.S. 
scholars and U.S. courts.283 There is probably no support for this theory in Europe 
either. 285
to drive the weaker ones into financial failure. If this should happen not only would the weaker teams fail, but 
eventually the whole league ... would fail”.
285 Wood v. NBA, 809 F2d. 954 (2d. Cir. 1987) antitrust action based on league collective bargaining policy; 
Kapp v NFL, 586 F.2d. 644 (9th Cir. 1978) cert, denied. 441 U.S. 907 (1979) where the U.S Supreme Court held 





























































































THE FUTURE APPLICATION OF COMPETITION LAW 



























































































Chapter 11 - Concluding remarks
11.1 To set the limits - a balancing act
Although the sports sector has long tried to ward off outside interference in its 
internal rules, judicial scrutiny has changed the situation. As was illustrated in 
Part I of this thesis, the application of Community law to sport is justified when 
there is an economic activity involved. The sale of broadcasting rights to sport 
events is quite definitely an economic activity; moreover, it constitutes a sector 
where the prices for those rights constantly seems to rise. It was very probably 
unthinkable originally that the provisions on competition law would deal with the 
sale of broadcasting rights to football matches when the Treaty of Rome was first 
established, and, the broadcast of sport events was in its infancy and without the 
possibility of much financial remuneration ever being involved. Although no one 
at that time could foresee the current problems, it is argued here that the rules on 
competition are the right forum to deal with any distortion in competition 
regarding the sale and purchase of sports broadcasting rights. This is valid both 
on a Community level, by the application of Articles 85 and 86 and on a national 
level by application of the corresponding provision in the various national 
competition acts.
The attribution of ownership to a sports event is a complex question, as was 
illustrated in Part II of this thesis. That situation is normally regulated by contract 
with the broadcaster, in accordance with the rules set up by the sports association. 
There is little national legislation in this area. However, the legality of the 
attribution of broadcasting rights have, for several sporting events, been disputed. 
In the case of a judicial analysis, a number of factors have to be taken into 
account. The determining criteria tend to be who holds the actual organisational 
responsibility and who takes the economic risk for the event. It is the 
determination of ownership that lies behind any competition law assessment of 
the legality of a collective sale of broadcasting rights. It is argued that 
broadcasting rights usually belong to the home club which organises the game or 
event at hand. However, if a national association takes upon it the economic risk 
and the organisational tasks involved in organising the games, then it may 
consequently be entitled to sell the rights as those rights may then belong to it; 
thus, there is no longer question of a collective sale of rights because the rights 
already belong to it.
A sports league is, in its very nature, a cartel, a point which was seen in both Parts 
I and III. Since this form of cartel is necessary for the very existence of the 
league, it is argued that the question is not whether competition law should fully 
apply to sports because this is a contradiction in terms, as there would not 
necessarily be any professional sports organisations then. The problem lies in the 




























































































competition law is applicable to sports bodies and, on the other hand, it has also 
been found that sports bodies are different to other undertakings since they need 
to combine in order to produce their product. But, where should the line be drawn 
between restrictions that are promoting competition and those that are anti­
competitive? It is clear that the behaviour of the football clubs selling television 
rights collectively would not be acceptable in any other market. However, the 
specific characteristics of sports must be taken into consideration when assessing 
such agreements. The question then becomes: to what extent is the anti­
competitive behaviour necessary for the viability of a league, and when should it 
be established that such cooperation goes too far and then constitutes anti­
competitive behaviour external to the functioning of the league and thus cannot 
be justified? There must be a distinction between restrictions on competition that 
are necessary for the viability of a league, and those which are merely concerned 
with a league’s internal functioning, that is the size of that league, the allocation 
of production, and the distribution of playing resources. Collective sales of 
television transmission agreements are, in most cases, not necessary for the 
continued viability of a league. It is admitted in this LL.M. thesis that they do 
have an important economic impact, but since they are sold to television 
companies which are dependent on these rights in order to offer them to 
consumers and advertisers, it is logical to let a league act as a monopolistic seller. 
In the long run, it is the consumers who have to pay for these monopolistic prices. 
Free competition between the clubs would, on the contrary, allow the clubs 
contractual freedom and would then leave the price to be determined by market 
forces.
Brinckman and Vollebregt is of the opinion that “regulating bodies in sport may 
need an objective justification for cumulating regulatory activities and marketing 
of broadcasting rights.”286 These authors submit as objective justification the 
possibility that the regulatory bodies possesses the broadcasting rights under 
national law. Moreover, they also submit that it is possible to draw an analogy 
with the Court of Justice’s and the Commission’s policy on agricultural 
cooperatives and collecting societies for authors of artistic works.287 It is in this 
thesis argued that these arguments regarding objective justifications are not very 
well founded. It is rare that the regulatory bodies possess the broadcasting rights 
under national law; indeed this is a case which is only regulated in France.288 The 
analogy solution cannot be accepted either. The examples given constitutes 
restrictive application of E C. competition law and should not be applied by 
analogy to the marketing of sports broadcasting rights.
286 Brinckman, & Vollebregt. The Marketing o f Sports ami its Relation to EC. Competition Law, supra note 42, 
p. 285.
* 7 Ibid.




























































































At the time when there were no private TV channels, sports events were 
broadcast by public service broadcasters; there was no competition between them 
because they were assured access to events held in other countries due to the 
reciprocal Eurovision system enshrined by the European Broadcasting Union.289 
But, along with the deregulation and development of different modes of 
broadcasting, there exists today a large number of buyers operating on the sports 
rights market. Therefore, competition on the providers side, that is, between the 
clubs has suddenly come to be seen as an essential issue.
The Bosman case was the first occasion on which the fundamental patterns 
operating within a particular sport have been conclusively ruled by the European 
Court of Justice to be incompatible with Community law. Although the transfer 
rules in Bosman were likely to be found contrary to the competition rules there is 
a difference between transfer rules, which are purely internal regulations which 
operate amongst football clubs, and the sale of broadcasting rights, which create a 
monopoly of supply in the sports rights market and thus affect the relationship 
with external purchasers, broadcasters and/or sports rights agencies. It is therefore 
argued in this thesis that collective sales are an even more anti-competitive 
practice and that action is necessary in this area too. If financial support is needed 
by the clubs situated at the bottom end of a league, this should not be enacted by a 
collective sale of rights, but in a way which does not distort competition on the 
broadcasting rights market. Indeed, as Sloane argues: “[although sports leagues 
could usefully devote more attention to revenue-sharing arrangements to ensure 
sporting equality, they will more effectively promote the welfare of member clubs 
by encouraging enterprise and innovation in the marketing so as to enlarge total 
revenue.”290
11.2 Future assessment of football cartels - the Premier League
Due to the DFB  and the KNVB cases, the collective sales of broadcasting 
agreements are likely to be disputed in other countries as well, something which 
concerns football, but which may also be applicable to other team sports which 
are an important part of sports broadcasting. An agreement which shares features 
with the KNVB experience is a case pending in the UK’s Restrictive Trade 
Practices Court against the Premier League Football operating in England, which 
has been brought by the Office of Fair Trading.291 The agreement of the Premier 
League which has been challenged under the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
1976, relates to the rules and regulation of the Football Associations’s (FA) 
Premier League which prevents the clubs from selling their television rights 
without prior permission from the Premier League. Consequently, the Premier
289 See Commission decision of 19 February' 199, case IV/32.524 - Screensport/  EBU Members, O.J. 1991, 
L/63/32.
290 See Sloane, P., Sport in the Market? The Economic Causes and Consequences o f  the ‘Packer revolution', 
supra note 12, p. 37.




























































































League has negotiated the sale of all the clubs' broadcasting rights collectively. 
The Office of Fair Trading regards this as significantly anti-competitive, since it 
prevents member clubs from competing with each other in the supply of 
broadcasting rights. Thus, higher rates extracted from the broadcasters by this 
monopolistic situation might be passed on to consumers.292
Another issue regards the Premier League’s sale of exclusive rights to British Sky 
Broadcasting (BSkyB) and to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) for a 
period of five years up to and including the 1996-97 football season. The rights 
concerned both live transmissions and the highlights of recorded matches; indeed, 
with this agreement the broadcasters were also given a prioritised right to another 
term of five years. The Office of Fair Trading argues that the Premier League, by 
selling the rights collectively and exclusively to the highest bidder on behalf of its 
members, is effectively acting as a cartel, with the net effect being to inflate costs 
and prices. The oral procedure in this particular case will not take place until the 
beginning of 1999. However, if the Restrictive Trade Practices Court follows the 
same line of argument as the Office of Fair Trading, the German Federal Supreme 
Court and the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, this will presumably be the 
last time that the Premier League will have been able to sell broadcasting rights 
collectively.
11.3 An exemption for sport in European competition law seems unlikely
This national approach to sports is intimately linked to the Community’s policy in 
this area, wherefore the Member States may not totally chose their own direction 
because the Commission surveys and prohibits any attempts which may be 
contrary to Community law. The Community recognises the social importance of 
sport and sees it as an important measure of European integration and as a means 
in the process of building up a European identity.293 However, a general 
exemption for sport from the scope of European antitrust legislation seems to be 
out of the question, nor does it appear that a European equivalent to the U.S. 
Sports Broadcasting Act is likely. The Commission has also pointed out that it 
does not except any general sports exemptions in the competition acts of any 
Member States. When the German Federal Supreme Court had confirmed a 
decision prohibiting the Deutscher FuBball-Bund from selling television rights 
collectively, the German Chancellor expressed the intention of exempting football 
from the scope of German competition law, an initiative which met with by heavy 
disapproval from the Commission.294 This leads to the question: what action 
might be taken at the Community level in relation to a country such as France 
where there are no explicit exemptions for sport from competition laws but, a
292 See XXVIIih Report on Competition Policy 1996, at p. 334.
293 See Protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 24.





























































































collective sale of the rights is approved by law because the rights to the matches 
are assured the national association?
11.4 What about countries where the broadcasting rights have been 
granted to the national football league/federation by statute?
There is no risk that the collective sale of broadcasting rights in France to any 
sport might be held to be contrary to the French Competition Act295 since the 
national associations in every sport have been granted the position as organiser by 
statute. Still, such behaviour might be condemned under E.C. competition rules, 
since the legislation, which denies the French clubs the right to ownership of their 
matches, establishes a sales cartel through the national football federation and 
thereby fixes prices. This legislation could be assessed under Article 85 E.C., read 
in conjunction with Articles 5 and 2(g), and then condemned because this 
legislation distorts / 'effet utile of the competition rules.296 This question is an 
interesting one; however there is not enough space here to develop it much 
further. What may be noted, neverhteless, is that although the sport bodies are at 
present granted the monopoly as organiser, they cannot just behave in any way 
they wish. If they are considered to have overwhelming market power within a 
specific market, they may not abuse such power. Behaviour such as that is 
condemned under Article 86 E.C., as well as by subsequent provisions in the 
French Competition Act. Consequently, the French courts, the Commission or the 
Court of First Instance can examine the behaviour of the French Football 
Association under these provisions.
11.5 Is the economic particularity of sports accepted by the courts?
Despite various courts' discussions about the financial viability of leagues, it must 
be questioned whether they have actually taken into consideration the differences 
which exist between sports and other businesses. It is doubtful whether the 
argument can be sustained that the national courts have actually accepted the 
economic specifics of sports when they assessed their cases. Contrary to 
Advocate General Lenz’s opinion on the Bosnian case, there is no other specific 
recognition of the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis or of the specifics of 
professional team sports. However, the German courts did discuss the financial 
viability of the German leagues. Without considering why a division of the 
league’s income between the teams might be necessary, that is to protect the 
uncertainty of outcome, they came to the conclusion that there were less 
restrictive means of protecting the financially weaker clubs.
The conclusion that competition law is applicable to sports bodies, and the factual 
situation that several courts have condemned the collective sales of television 
broadcasting rights for football matches, does not mean that there is a per se
295 Ordonnance of 1 December 1986.




























































































prohibition on their collective sales in every Member State of the European 
Community. As in every competition law analysis, the precedents have to be 
applied to the facts in any given case, which means that, where football rights are 
not an important part of the sports rights market, an appreciable restraint on 
competition does not then exist. In cases where it is impossible for the clubs to 
sell their rights individually, perhaps because there is not much competition 
between the broadcasters or even not enough interest in acquiring football rights, 
it might not be considered that the collective sale of those particular sport 
broadcasting rights is anticompetitive.
The sports sector must face the reality of a situation that it has itself created, that 
is the increased commercialisation of their sector and the subsequently tightened 
relations that now exists with other sectors of the economy. It may not be denied 
that there are reasons to apply competition law to sports. Of course, the specific 
economy of sports must be respected as far as possible in any legal analysis; 
however, these characteristics do not justify a total exemption for the sports sector 
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